CRISIS OVER CHINA

CONTAINS "MY VISIT TO CHINA"
CLEMENT ATTLEE
INTRODUCTION

No issue divides the free world as sharply as do differences over China policy. America stands almost alone in its support of Chiang Kai-shek. Her determined opposition has been mainly responsible for keeping Communist China from being admitted to the United Nations.

If the present Formosa crisis does not explode into war it is likely that Communist China may be admitted to UN membership when the General Assembly meets again. If this takes place, American public opinion will react strongly against the UN and those of our allies who opposed our policy, unless some public discussion concerning these differences takes place.

This pamphlet seeks to explore the China dispute and to stimulate thinking on the matter. It attempts to interpret the position of other democracies, like Britain on this issue — a position all too often dismissed by the phrase, "they're soft on communism."

The appendix contains excerpts from the articles written by Clement R. Attlee concerning his trip to China last year. Attlee is one of the few Westerners to visit there since the Communist conquest, and his account is basic to an understanding of present day China.

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CRISIS OVER CHINA

IS CHINA IN THE UN?

China is a member of the United Nation. In 1945 when the UN was founded, China was not only admitted but was made one of the five permanent members of the Security Council with the veto. The rest of the Big Five were France, Great Britain, Soviet Union and the United States. China was given this place of importance because:

1. It was the world's largest nation, with a population of 582 million people, one-fourth of the world's total.

2. It was to represent the Asian countries which contain over 50% of the world's population. The five permanent seats on the Security Council were assigned largely on a regional basis with China given special responsibility for Asia.

Therefore, the present debate over China does not involve admittance to the United Nations as such, but rather which government, that of Mao Tse-tung or Chiang Kai-shek, should represent the mainland of China.

HAS THE UN FACED THIS PROBLEM BEFORE?

The problem of choosing between two different groups claiming to represent the same country is not a new one for the United Nations. The issue arose in 1948 when the Communists overthrew the democratic government of Czechoslovakia. The Czechoslovakian Communists were seated and recognized in the United Nations as the official representatives of that country. Likewise, Latin American governments which "shoot their way into power" are accorded this recognition with no discussion as to whether fair or foul methods were used to gain power. When the Chinese Communists came into power late in 1949, it was expected that their representatives would soon be seated. In fact, months before the Communists consolidated their conquest of the China mainland, the world powers including the United States were prepared to recognize a Communist government and to deal with such a regime.

The United States and other nations left their consulates in the cities taken over by the Communists. When the Communists occupied Nanking, the American ambassador remained behind to deal with
the new authorities instead of following the Kuomintang government
to Formosa. The U.S. had announced at the UN that although it
opposed seating the Chinese Communist delegates, it would not vote
against the measure if the other countries of the world favored it.
Negotiations to effect this change of representation were in progress
when the Korean war broke out. With China's entry into the Korean
conflict on the side of North Korea, the United States reversed its
position and since then has refused to seat the Chinese Communists.
The Korean armistice has again brought the question before the UN.

WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF THE UNITED NATIONS?
The UN was established to
act as a meeting place where all
nations could gather to work for
peace. It is the world's forum
and to attempt to change it into
a "club" of like-minded nations
would be to destroy its purpose
and aims. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, in 1950 supported
universal membership for the UN when he stated:
"I have now come to believe that the United Nations will best
serve the cause of peace if its Assembly is representative of what
the world actually is, and not merely representative of the parts
which we like. Therefore, we ought to be willing that all nations
should be members without attempting to appraise clearly those which
are 'good' and those which are 'bad'. Already that distinction is
obliterated by the present membership of the United Nations.
"Some of the present member nations, and others that might
become members, have governments that are not representative of
the people. But if in fact they are 'governments' — that is, if they
'govern'—then they have a power which should be represented in
any organization that purports to mirror world reality."

WHO REPRESENTS CHINA — MAO TSE-TUNG OR
CHIANG KAI-SHEK?
There are four generally accepted standards which a govern-
ment should meet in order to represent a nation internationally. They
require that a government:
1. have effective control over the territory of the country;
2. be sovereignly independent;
3. be truly representative in character;
4. accept its international obligations.

1. Effective control over the territory of the country:
MAO: The Chinese Communists control the China mainland of 582
million people. During their five years in power, they have estab-
lished a centralized, bureaucratic government which reaches into
every town, village and hamlet in the country. Though a dictatorship, the Chinese Communists do 'govern'. For the first time in modern history China has a national government.

CHIANG: Driven from the mainland in 1949, the Nationalist government (Kuomintang) fled to the island of Formosa where a government in exile was set up. The island with a population of 9 million, is about 130 miles off the China coast. In addition to the island of Formosa, the Chinese Nationalist government controls the Pescadores Islands with a population of 60,000 and 100 miles from the China mainland, plus Quemoy and the Matsus which are strategically important because they dominate the harbors of Amoy and Foochow which face out on the Formosa Strait. Until recently the Nationalist government also controlled the off-shore islands of Yikiang, Nanki and the Tachens but recently the former were captured and the Tachens occupied when the Nationalists withdrew.

2. Sovereign independence:

MAO: Though Communist China is unquestionably closely tied to the Soviet Union, it cannot be considered a Soviet puppet. A high-ranking State Department official, Alfred le Sesne Jenkins in charge of the Chinese Political Affairs, stated in April 1954 that:

"The difference in status in Peiping and its relationship with Moscow (as distinguished from that of the Eastern European satellites) is due chiefly to its having come to power without benefit, except in Manchuria, of Soviet army occupation; to the prestige of Mao Tsetung, arising from his long history of leadership of Chinese Communism and his literary contributions to theoretical communism; to China’s assumption of the role of leadership in the Communist program for Asia; and to the geographical position, size and importance of China itself. This relationship has been characterized as that of junior partner, and the association has every mark of being a willing, determined and close one."

Mao won because he convinced the Chinese people that only the Communists could effectively deal with the problems of hunger, poverty and disease.

CHIANG: Though independent, Chiang Kai-shek’s government is closely tied to the United States. Three-fourths of the money spent by the Chinese Nationalist government on Formosa is supplied by the American people; defense of the island from attack by the Chinese Communists is by the U. S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet; training of Nationalist troops is supervised by United States officers; U. S. jet-fighter planes are based on the island. It is the United States which made the decision to withdraw from the Tachen islands.

3. Truly representative in character:

Freely conducted elections are the only method by which a definitive
answer can be obtained. Since neither Mao nor Chiang have allowed any country-wide free elections to take place since coming to power, reports, and on-the-spot observations must be the source.

MAO: N. Y. Times correspondent, Henry Lieberman in describing reports reaching Hong Kong from Communist China wrote: "While the revolution appears to have gone sour for many business men, peasants and intellectuals, the Peiping Regime still seems to have the strong support of millions of others—in the armed forces and among the favored bureaucrats and technicians, among young people (especially those of middle school age) and employed urban workers."

Tillman Durdin, another Times Far Eastern correspondent reported: "The new regime appears to be firmly ensconced in Communist China, at least at the present time. No serious threat to its control is evident."

CHIANG: The postwar Nationalist occupation of Formosa has left much to be desired. In 1946 under the terms of the Cairo Conference, Formosa was turned over to the Republic of China. Chen Yi, first governor sent by Chiang, treated Formosa as an occupied country and removed from administrative posts all local officials. State monopolies, inefficient and corrupt, were set up manned by mainland Chinese.

In 1947 the killing of a Formosan woman selling non-tax paid cigarettes touched off a riot. In reprisal Chinese troops slaughtered 10,000 native inhabitants including most of the local leadership.

Conditions improved when a new governor was brought in. In 1949 repressions were resumed with another change in the governor. However, there is no indication at this time of any attempt to overthrow Chiang on Formosa, and it must be assumed that his control over the island is as solid as that of the Communists over the mainland.

4. Acceptance of its international obligations:
MAO: Most Americans feel strongly that Communist China has flaunted its international obligations because:

(1) It was a participant in the Korean war against the United Nations:

(2) It supplied the Vietminh forces in Indochina against the French:

(3) It imprisons and abuses American citizens and military personnel.

They feel that China has refused to abide by the common rules and procedures developed in international relations, and has acted like other Communist dominated nations such as the Soviet Union and its eastern satellite countries in its conduct of foreign affairs.

Some people argue, however, that China's toughness particularly
against the United States is mainly an attempt to bargain its way into power, and that (1) once it had been accorded international recognition some of its might disappear; that (2) it is impossible for relations between the U.S. and Communist China to deteriorate any further short of war; and that (3) admission to the United Nations might improve them.

CHIANG: The Nationalist government has a better record than the Communists, chiefly because of United States intervention and control. Either because of Chiang's lack of ability or desire to curb the remnants of Nationalist troops in Northern Burma, that government was forced to take the matter to the UN in order to protect her own citizens from being pillaged and from a possible Communist Chinese invasion to knock out the raiders. Although the UN has supported Burma on this issue during the past 2 years, the question still has not been completely settled.

WHO WANTS MAO?

Since January 1950 the question of Chinese representation has arisen 150 times within the UN and its agencies. Thus far the American policy has been to oppose seating Communist China, but to avoid any show-down vote in the General Assembly or the Security Council. To do this, at the opening of the General Assembly held each September, the U.S. moves to postpone the issue for that session. So far this procedure has been successful. At its September, 1954 session, the General Assembly voted 43-11 with six abstentions to support the American position.

An analysis of the vote indicates that opposition to seating the Peiping regime is not the overwhelming majority of the UN as has been claimed. In fact, if population figures are used it is not even a majority. The 43 nations voting in the majority included the United States, the Latin-American nations, Western Europe, Nationalist China, and some Asian and Middle Eastern nations. The population of these countries totals 648 millions. The 11 countries voting in effect to seat Peiping's representatives were the Soviet Bloc (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Soviet Union), the Scandinavian countries, plus India, Burma and Yugoslavia; these countries add up to 673 millions, about one-third of which are accounted for by the Communist countries. The 6 abstentions were the Arab nations and Indonesia with a total population of 123 millions, most of whom would also favor seating China if a clear-cut vote to that effect were taken.

It must also be emphasized that this vote does not accurately reflect the attitude of many countries as to whether they themselves
should recognize Communist China, i.e. maintain diplomatic relations with Peiping. The following countries other than the Soviet bloc recognize the Chinese Communists as the legitimate representatives of the Chinese people:

<table>
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<th>Country</th>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Israel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burma</td>
<td>Norway</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
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<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
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<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>Switzerland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
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The discrepancy between the actions of nations who recognize Communist China but yet refuse to vote to seat its representatives at the UN can only be attributed to the influence and power of the United States. It is questionable as to how long these nations will bow to American wishes.

Various individuals and organizations in the past year have urged that the UN and the United States reconsider their position. Among them have been:

**Alf Landon**, Republican nominee for President in 1936, on January 26, 1954 said that the question of admitting China into the UN should be used as a bargaining point with the Soviet Union.

**John Cowles**, President of the Minneapolis Star, on March 3, 1954 declared that we should consider seating China if they agree to some kind of settlement in Indochina and Korea.

**Lester Pearson**, Foreign Minister of Canada, on March 11, 1954 declared: "In due course Canada would have to recognize the government of China which the Chinese people recognize whether Canada liked that government or not."


**Sir Gladwyn Jebb**, former British delegate to the UN, and **Dag Hammarskjold**, UN Secretary General, both agreed on March 19, 1954 that China should be admitted when aggression in Korea and Indochina ended.

**Clement Davies**, leader of the Liberal Party of Great Britain, on June 24, 1954 called for U.S. recognition of Communist China and seating in the UN.

**Both wings of the British Labor Party** have advocated the same policy of recognition and admittance for a long time.

**Clifton Webb**, Minister of Exterior Affairs for New Zealand, on July 7, 1954 declared that "there was reason to believe that ad-
mission might help in driving a wedge between China and the Soviet Union.”

Canadian Congress of Labor, Canada’s counter-part of the CIO on October 2, 1954 urged the recognition and seating of Communist China at the same time defeating the Communist-supported candidate for president of the federation by over 9 to 1.

William O. Douglas, Justice of the Supreme Court, on January 31, 1955 called for seating both Communist and Nationalist China in the UN.

Those who do not want to recognize and/or seat Communist China in the UN advance some of the following arguments:

1. U. S. cannot recognize the Peiping government which “shot its way into power”.
   BUT U. S. recognizes Franco Spain as well as Latin American governments like Guatemala which shot their way into power.

2. U. S. cannot recognize Peiping because it is dominated by Communists.
   BUT U. S. recognizes Communist countries such as the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc.

3. U. S. doesn’t want any other Communist dominated nations admitted to the UN.
   BUT Admission of Communist China would only increase the Communist Bloc from 5 votes to 6.

   BUT Two vetos are no more effective than the one which the Soviet Union commands.

5. U. S. support of Communist China would be a betrayal of Chiang Kai-shek and his government.
   BUT There is no evidence that any large section of the Chinese people prefer Chiang.

**IS MAO A COMMUNIST?**

Mao Tse-tung has made no secret of his Communist allegiance. Shortly after coming to power, he declared that his regime would pursue a “lean to one side” policy in foreign affairs, aligning the new China with the Kremlin world. The Peiping government has not deviated from this course, but explanations for this development differ. The United States and its spokesmen maintain that the Chinese Communists are dedicated “to the proposition of world Communist revolution under the leadership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics” and therefore, it is impossible to expect any independent action or responsible behavior from Peiping. However, many of the United States’ allies believe
that a rupture may occur eventually between the USSR and China, particularly if the Western world develops a policy to exploit the potential points of disagreement between China and the Soviet Union. Clement R. Attlee, former British Prime Minister, reporting on his tour of Communist China writes:

"... the Chinese Communists necessarily depend to a large extent on Russian aid. This is quite natural, and is, I think, partly due to American policy, which by seeking to put a cordon sanitaire around China naturally throws her into the arms of Russia."

In 1950 China conducted 25% of her trade with the Communist bloc. Today the proportion has increased to 75%.

Official U. S. policy is not only a defeatist attitude but a dangerous one; in effect, it is handing over to Moscow and totalitarian communism the world's largest country with one-fourth of the world's population. As John Foster Dulles recently said, this "combined power can dominate the Eurasian continent." Therefore, it is for survival's sake that chinks in the armor must be found or created,—that a wedge be driven between the Soviet Union and Communist China. The following divisive factors and tensions are present in the Moscow-Peiping axis, which could make Mao the Tito of Asia:

1. The Chinese Communists are not indebted to the Soviet Union for the success of their revolution. Fierce nationalism as well as Communist ideology inspired the revolutionaries, with victory attained independently of Moscow. As in Yugoslavia, no Russian troops were used which means that the Soviet police do not control the country. This is unlike the eastern satellite nations where the Russian army forced Communist governments on the people and stands ready to back them up.

2. Chinese nationalism may conflict with Russian imperialism. Historically China has been one of the chief victims of Russian expansion with most of the Soviet Far East stolen from China a century ago. Chinese suspicions of Russian intentions still exist. The latest China-Soviet pact, signed in October, 1954, represents important concessions to Chinese nationalism. The previous two pacts of 1950 and 1952 found the Chinese making the concessions. This time the Russians agreed to:

(1) evacuate the important harbor of Port Arthur by May 31, 1955;
(2) provide additional economic aid estimated at about $100 million;
(3) dissolve four joint Soviet-Chinese stock companies;
(4) jointly construct a new trans-Siberian railway, and
(5) urge Japan to normalize its relations with them, i. e., break with the U. S.
Even more important than the terms of this agreement are the circumstances surrounding the negotiations. The 1950 pact was announced in Moscow after Mao-tse Tung had gone there, remaining for two months. Again in 1952, it was the Chinese who went to Russia for negotiations preceding the agreement. In 1954 the Russians traveled to Peiping with a delegation composed of virtually every major figure in the Kremlin hierarchy. This time the Russians made nearly all the compromises.

3. The Soviet Union faces a dilemma as China attempts to industrialize. It is to her advantage to see China industrialize sufficiently in order to prove that Communism can work in an Asian country. For that purpose she is contributing about seven times more economic aid to China than the U. S. is giving to India — China's only rival for Asian leadership. On the other hand, if China progresses rapidly along those lines, she will become less dependent on the Soviet Union. At the same time she may decide to try to give leadership to the Asian Communist parties rather than have them turn to Moscow for direction. As an Asian nation of colored peoples, her potential propaganda appeal may be greater than that of the Soviet Union. It is doubtful that a strong China with one-quarter of the world's population, three times that of the Soviet Union, will be content to remain in the shadow of Moscow.

4. The international recognition which Moscow professes to want for China may backfire. At present it is impossible for the U. S. to negotiate directly with Communist China on international tension areas since her government is not recognized nor represented in the UN. This forces mainland China to depend on the Soviet Union to act as her international spokesman.

It was the Soviet Delegate to the UN, Jacob Malik, who announced that he thought the Chinese were willing to settle for a cease-fire in Korea. It was the same Malik who announced that he thought the Chinese would be willing to go along on the compromise proposed by the Indians for settling the Prisoner of War issue. If China were recognized and seated in the UN it would be possible for countries to negotiate with her directly and thus try to by-pass the Soviet Union and possibly attain some independent settlement.

**IMPORTANCE OF FORMOSA**

Both the President and his advisers have very carefully phrased their references to the military value of Formosa and the adjacent islands. It has usually been expressed in terms that "it was important that these islands should remain in friendly hands." Although using the term "important" no responsible government official has ever used the much higher military priority of "essential" or "vital."
A look at the map (back cover) will show why Formosa has received this low military classification. It is true that if Formosa fell into the hands of the Communists it would breach the island chain extending from Japan through the Ryukyu Islands and Okinawa, and continuing south past Formosa and the Philippines. However, present bases on both the Chinese mainland and North Korea are closer to both Japan and Okinawa than is Formosa. Likewise, Chinese mainland bases are almost as close to the Philippines as is Formosa. The loss of Formosa would not be a critical blow to other American defense commitments in this area of the world.

In spite of Chiang's "back to the mainland" cry there is little likelihood of that occurring. A comparison of the military strength of the Chinese Communists and Nationalists illustrates that point.

### MILITARY STRENGTH

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<tr>
<th>MANPOWER:</th>
<th>Nationalist</th>
<th>Communist</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marines</td>
<td>13,000</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Corps</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>75-100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>50 - 70,000</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>SEA AND AIR POWER:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy (Total Ships)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Subs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planes (Total)</td>
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<td>Jets</td>
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| Communist Airpower (In Asia) | 7-8,000 |
| U. S. Airpower (In Asia)    | 3-4,000 |

The average age of Chiang's troops is now over 30, far above that of a good fighting force. Although the Nationalists have announced a policy of drafting native Formosans to correct this defect there will be little enthusiasm among these conscripts for a "return to the mainland." An additional military problem posed for Chiang are the 800-900 generals and similarly large number of admirals to whom the Chinese Communists are beaming their propaganda to come home. It may very well be that upon the death of Chiang this group may make a deal with the Communists to return to posts in the armed forces of the mainland.

### PROSPECTS OF WAR OVER FORMOSA

Although not considered militarily "essential" Formosa has received that priority from the National Security Council in political terms. Several factors have resulted in such a decision. First there is the feeling that there can be no further retreat in Asia or the Com-
munists will be encouraged to expand further; secondly, it is an attempt to appease such groups as the Knowland wing of the Republican Party, together with Admiral Radford and other preventive war advocates both in military circles and the State Department. Americans have often criticized Asians for their desire to save face. Yet, American policy on Formosa is dictated probably as much by this consideration as any other.

In December, 1954 a military aid pact was signed with the Nationalist government to guarantee the security of Formosa and the Pescadores "and such other territories as may be determined by mutual agreement." In January, 1955 a similar Congressional resolution was passed by an overwhelming majority.

Neither action made any commitment to defend Quemoy and the Matsus but Senator Wayne Morse among others voted against the resolution in light of the fact that both Secretary of State Dulles and three of the four Joints Chiefs of Staff as early as last September advocated an all out defense of Quemoy. An attack on the mainland of China was called for if the Communists started any action that could be interpreted as a direct threat to Formosa. Dulles further stated that the mere mobilizing of troops along the coast might serve to justify such an attack.

It should be remembered that both Quemoy and the Matsus have always been a part of China which is not the case with Formosa. Quemoy in Nationalist hands is equivalent to Long Island in the hands of an unfriendly power since both lie right off their respective mainlands.

At present there is a grave threat that war may result if the American government supports Chiang's efforts to hold the Matsus and Quemoy since the Communists are determined to take them and have the military power to try it.

Retaliation by attacking the mainland as Admiral Radford and others advocate means full scale hostilities.

On the other hand there is little likelihood now of war from a direct attack on the Pescadores or Formosa since the Communists do not have the military equipment for such an extensive operation.

In five to ten years the situation will have completely changed. By then China will have a navy and a fleet of medium and heavy
bombers together with atomic missiles. Formosa will be about three minutes away by jet bomber making it impossible for defenders to gain altitude in time to intercept. At the same time, the Seventh Fleet will be "sitting ducks" in such an attack. The military situation has greatly changed from 1950, when Harry Truman's simple order for the Seventh Fleet to patrol the Formosan Strait was sufficient to prevent an invasion. Given the inevitable increase in Communist military strength over the next decade, plus the determination to take Formosa, makes war inevitable in the long run, unless a settlement is negotiated.

**WHAT TO DO**

- The U. S. government ought to make it clear to the peoples of the world that it has no intentions of ferrying Chiang back to the mainland. Although withdrawal from the Tachens shows that to be U. S. policy this has not been spelled out to other countries. Our support of Chiang is not a political asset but rather a liability. The attitude of most of non-Communist Asia can best be expressed by Prime Minister Nehru who declared that the Chinese Nationalist government on Formosa "does not represent any other part of Asia except the Island of Formosa and how much of that it represents I don't know."

- The U. S. government ought to stop making decisions on the basis of whether it will please the Knowland-Radford axis which seeks to involve us in war.

- The U. S. government ought to urge the Nationalists to withdraw from Quemoy and the Matsus since they legitimately belong to mainland China; they are indefensible; they can lead to World War III if the U. S. attacks the China mainland in their defense.

- The U. S. ought to strive for an overall Asian settlement. This means that we and the Communists ought to negotiate patiently, and in private if necessary, on a wide variety of issues:
  1. A cease-fire in the Formosan area.
  2. Recognition and seating of Communist China in the UN.
  3. The placing of Formosa under a UN Trusteeship until a plebiscite is held to allow the Formosans themselves to decide whether they wish to be part of Communist China, Nationalist China, or an independent Formosa.
  4. The granting of a UN non-aggression pact to Formosa for protection against Communist China.
  5. The granting of a UN non-aggression pact to Communist China for protection against Formosa.
6. Truce violations in Korea.
7. The status of 8 million Chinese in Southeast Asian countries which mainland China now claims as its own citizens thus creating potential Fifth Columns.

**POSITIVE PROGRAM**

The U. S. ought to work through the UN to solve the basic economic problems of this part of the world rather than concentrating on such military organizations like the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) made up of Australia, France, Great Britain, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand and the United States because SEATO antagonizes the very countries like India whom we seek to help.

There are two important practical issues that every American citizen can work on.

The UN has a number of specialized agencies like the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the World Health Organization (WHO) which need support. Their annual budgets for teaching new "self-help techniques" total about $25 million a year, an amount slightly less than what the city of New York spends annually for collecting garbage. On this tiny budget these agencies are expected to deal with the problems of need faced by 2/3 of the world’s population.

The average man in this part of the world lives to be 30.

His diet averages 20% below that necessary for minimum health.

His per capita income is 1/20 that of an American.

He can neither read nor write.

It is here that the Communists are making gains because they seem to offer an alternative to these miserable conditions.

Nevertheless, the U. S. Congress as of this date has not made its contribution of $8 million to these agencies which it owes for current operations. Yet, at the same time 60 B-52 jet bombers, each costing $8 million, capable of delivering the H-Bomb have been ordered.

But merely being shown what to do is not enough. Capital is necessary to do the job of reconstruction. The "have-not" nations of the world have asked the United Nations to set up the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) to make available at low interest rates a sum of $250 million. The "have" nations of the world oppose such a fund on the grounds that they cannot contribute until a disarmament program enables them to cut their military expenditures. The total U. S. share for this program would be about $85 million, or the cost of 2 naval destroyers. If we refuse to participate in SUNFED it will mean that much of the world will remain unfed.
The Chinese Communist party is completely Marxian in its philosophy and its organization is on the Russian model. At every key point a party member is in control. For instance, the trade unions are not organizations for the protection of the workers, they are instruments for obtaining greater production and for insuring the docility of the workers. The trade-union official, as often as not, has no knowledge of the industry. He is merely a party worker.

Of course, the convinced Marxians are a small minority of the population, but the younger generation of the intelligentsia is being carefully indoctrinated.

Nevertheless, there are differences in the Russian and the Chinese set-up. The Chinese revolution was based on the peasantry, for there was no real urban proletariat. It has been built up on an alliance among the peasantry, the intelligentsia and the small capitalists. Here Mao Tse-tung showed his strength in refusing to follow slavishly the Russian model. For instance, the better-off farmers, unlike the kulaks in Russia, have not been liquidated. There has been no attempt as yet to do away with the small trader and industrialist.

It may, of course, be said that these are early days and that the party will in due time introduce full-blown communism, but it will certainly be a difficult task, and in my view the Chinese leaders are unlikely to make the same mistakes as the Russians. I think that their actual policy is likely to be more flexible than their theories. I have the impression that the Chinese Communists have more genuine idealists in their ranks than have the Russians.

The leaders are men who have made the revolution and who still have a clear recollection of life under the old regime, unlike the present generation of Russians who might be termed career Com-
munists. Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai are revolutionists in their own right and, like Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia, strong characters. They must not be classed with the Communists stooges in the satellite countries.

**SOVIET AID IMPORTANT**

On the other hand, the Chinese Communists necessarily depend to a large extent on Russian aid. This is quite natural, and is, I think, partly due to American policy, which by seeking to put a cordon sanitaire around China naturally throws her into the arms of Russia. It must be recognized that there is violent hostility to America, partly due to American action over Formosa and the support given to Chiang Kai-shek, and partly because America is regarded as the chief support of colonialism and imperialism.

This has its humorous side when one considers the diatribes against British imperialism which used to come across the Atlantic. There is, too, the fact that the fomentation of hostility to an outside power is always a useful stimulus in strengthening a revolutionary regime and in stimulating effort. I do not think it is useful to speculate as to whether or not the undoubted goodwill expressed to us was genuine.

Personally, I think that the Chinese leaders desire peace in order to deal with the immense internal problems confronting them, and I should judge, too, that they would not be averse to having alternative sources of supply. They will not, I think, wish to be dependent on any other power.

Except for Mao Tse-tung himself, who is of peasant origin, the leadership, as is usual in Communist-controlled countries, is drawn from the middle class. It is only in social democratic countries that men with working-class backgrounds fill the important positions in government. It may well be that owing to the difficulties of the Chinese language there are few if any manual workers qualified to take an effective part in the leadership of the party and the government.

**LACK OF DEMOCRACY**

I think it is idle to expect the emergence in China of real democracy on Western lines. There is no tradition of it in China and, as far as one can see, no basis for it, as the trade-union movement is, as I have stated, undemocratic, and it would seem doubtful if the cooperative movement among the peasants will develop on democratic lines.

The most that one can say is that China has today a Government which seems to be honest and concerned with the welfare of the people, inspired by a real idealism and a fervent nationalism. Whether it will relapse into the old pattern of a corrupt privileged class is anybody's guess.
It is doubtful whether the virtues of toleration, which did formerly exist to some extent, will be practiced by the People’s Government. I doubt if free opinion will be allowed to express itself in the political field.

**LIFE IN A COLLECTIVE**

We drove some fifteen miles outside the city (Mukdin) to a farm which had for four years been run as a cooperative, but was now a collective. There were 160 families in the village, of whom 130 were in the collective farm. The individualist peasants seemed to live quite harmoniously with the others.

We were regaled with tea and a lot of statistics showing the progress made since the landlord was expropriated and the land divided up among the workers. While the bulk of the land was worked collectively, the members had individual plots for garden produce and owned their own pigs and chickens. The place seemed prosperous.

The houses were quite pleasant, generally two rooms and a small kitchen, and seemed to contain more personal possessions than those in the workers’ dwellings. The highlight was the nursery school. Chinese children are very charming, and two little girls seized me by the hand and accompanied me through the village.

I have no doubt that this is a showplace, but it certainly illustrates what can be done. I gathered that there were a good many cooperatives in the region. I think that with the abolition of landlordism, the lot of the peasant has improved.

On a Sunday morning we flew to Nanshan, a very big mining town of 600,000 inhabitants.

**BOOK BANNING**

We were given an official dinner in the rest house, with the leaders of the city, the trade unions and the party present. In the course of it, there was an illuminating discussion initiated by Aneurin Bevan apropos of the library.

He asked why certain works that had been translated into so many languages were not available. The answer was that the workers did not want such books. Pressed further as to works by Kropotkin and other well-known writers of the past, the answer was that there was no demand. Pressed still further, it was said that these books were not suitable for workers to read.

We pointed out that this was the kind of line that had been taken by reactionary governments in the past.

They were quite unimpressed. They were the judges of what was fit for the workers. This was, of course, not without its humorous
side. It was an enunciation by devotees of the supposed left of the typical sentiments of reactionary rulers and high priests throughout the ages. But it has its serious side.

Here, over this vast expanse of the world, from the Elbe River to the China Sea, the workers are not to be allowed to think for themselves. Books which might cause them to think will not even be printed. The curtain of ignorance is thicker and more dangerous than the Iron Curtain.

These hundreds of millions of illiterates will be given just enough education to enable them to be effective instruments of the slogan: "Increase production." Otherwise, they will hear only with the ears and see only with the eyes of their masters.

ROLE OF U. S.

. . . . We enjoyed a three-hour talk with Mao Tse-tung and his chief colleagues. The talk was frank on both sides. He explained the aims and methods of the People's Government, while we tried to enlighten him on the views of the Labor Party and of British democracy.

The discussion was vigorous but quite friendly. Toward the end of the meeting we were talking of the way to achieve peace. The Chinese expressed the view that the United States was aggressive and was seeking to build up a ring of subordinate states from Japan to Indochina. Whereupon I said, "As Russia has done in Europe?"

We assured him that the Americans were peace-loving people.

He suggested four points whereby he considered the Americans might assist in promoting world peace. These points, which included the evacuation of Formosa, the withdrawal of the American fleet from those waters, and the cessation of any attempt to arm Germany, have been made public, and some organs of the press seem to have suggested that we agreed with them and left it at that. In fact, it was suggested by the Chinese that these were points which we might try to get our Americans friends to agree to.

I pointed out that a two-way traffic was needed, and that they might propose to their Russian friends the giving of complete freedom to all the satellite states to choose their own governments, the reduction of armaments in the most heavily armed state in the world, Russia, and the cessation of Russian-inspired activities in other countries.

This exchange was part of a general debate in which we, on our side, tried to show the Chinese the other side to questions on which they seemed only to appreciate the Russian point of view.

On various matters, one tended to get the stock Communist answer: For instance, on the standard of life, they maintained that our superior standard was due to our exploitation of the colonies.
When I asked them to explain how Denmark, Sweden and Norway were also high on the scale, though they had no colonies, they could not answer.

**POPULATION INCREASE**

... It was indeed disturbing to hear their views on this question of standards, which I had tried to relate to the balance between population and resources.

The attitude of the Chinese Government on the question of population appeared to be that increase of population was in itself a good thing. They estimated an increase of 12,000,000 a year, and when questioned on the pressure of population on the means of subsistence, they said there was still much undeveloped land. When it was pointed out that this was a short-term answer, and when the experience of other nations, India, for instance, was quoted, they said that what was required was more productivity.

When it was suggested that the important thing was the relationship between production and the number of consumers, and that what was desirable was a higher standard of life, they could give no effective reply, except to say that China regarded a large population as desirable—tending to increase production of commodities.

They seemed to think that some restraint was possible in the towns, but not in the country. It was admitted that rural housing would need decades to bring it up to the standards of the towns. Yet, this standard, from our point of view, is deplorably low.

The world is faced, therefore, with a government that is prepared to see its population of 600,000,000 increase to 700,000,000 or 800,000,000 in the next two decades. Not only is there no policy of restraint but there is actual encouragement toward intense fruitfulness.

I think that the real reason for this is that China, being admittedly a backward country, hopes to make up in quantity what it lacks in quality, in order to achieve a position of power in the world. This is a disturbing thought.

**CHINESE REPLACE RUSSIANS**

... I was told that when Russian technicians were introduced into the country they were replaced as soon as possible by Chinese. This, no doubt, is part of the doctrine of self-sufficiency, which is a prominent feature of the new China. I do not think the Chinese wish to depend on outsiders to run their institutions, even if the outsiders are Communists.

**REDUCTION IN CRIME**

... In Shanghai, as in Peking, one is impressed by some very positive achievements. Flies seem to have been successfully extirpated in the city, and so have been other long-standing evils. I inquired
about the old problem of opium. I was told that when the present regime took over every opium smoker was registered and compelled to undergo treatment. The poppy is no longer cultivated and opium smoking seems to be at an end. Information on this score from Chinese sources was confirmed by Europeans of long experience in this country.

These latter also informed me that organized prostitution is now practically unknown.

Shanghai at one time had a very indifferent reputation for law and order. Formerly no woman would have thought of going out-of-doors by herself at night, but Europeans told me that now they had not the slightest hesitation in allowing their wives and daughters to go anywhere. Nowadays, also, they had no fear of burglary. By whatever means, a stern, almost puritanical, code of morals is somehow enforced. Bribery and corruption in the public service are not tolerated; offenders are severely dealt with, while sexual offenses entail a very heavy penalty.

The manager of a big enterprise told us that pilfering is now practically unhard of. All this, it seems to me, is remarkable and apparently was brought about largely by the voluntary action of the individual citizens who regard these old evils as being unworthy of the new China.

**TRANSPORT SCARCE**

In this great city there are tramcars, motor buses, a few lorries and a very few motorcars, but practically no animal transport. There are many pedicabs, which are used for conveying people as well as goods, but most heavy loads are handled by pushcart. Two or three men pulling, and one pushing a load of timber or flour is a common sight.

Similarly at the docks there are hardly any cranes. Beyond the use of ships’ derricks the work is done by human labor. In this port, with so little traffic now, more than 200,000 laborers are employed, many of them casually. At every turn one realizes how great is the need for more mechanical transport throughout China. I learned that local production of lorries and cars is not expected for two or three years. Apparently the authorities are prepared to wait rather than resort to foreign supplies.

**CHIANG’S RETURN DOUBTED**

Through the courtesy of Mr. Vietch, who, though not recognized as such, acts as a British consul in Shanghai, we were able to meet not only some Britons but a number of Europeans—Danes, Swedes, Swiss—and also Indians.

There is no doubt that the Europeans suffer a good deal of hard-
ships. They are virtually confined to the city. Their businesses have for the most part been taken over, and they are harassed in many ways quite unnecessarily. Many of them want to leave but have been compelled to remain.

It must be bitter for those who recall the position of Europeans in former days in Shanghai. Some, who remember the old gaiety of the city, have nothing good to say about the new regime. Their one desire is to get out. On the other hand, there are those who recognize that the past can never be revived and who freely acknowledge that in many respects the new regime is better than the old.

Some are pessimistic as to the future possibilities of trade. Others take the view that things are improving, and that in the course of time trade may revive. These latter fully accept the fact that Chinese now claim full equality with Europeans and realize that the new relationship of Asians and Europeans has come to stay. It was, I thought, noteworthy that among these were some who had had the longest experience of living in China. They also thought that our visit was timely and useful.

In all my travels I never met anyone who felt that the Kuomintang could be reinstated.

DETOUR OVER FLOODED AREA

... We flew to Canton. Because of the activity of Chiang Kai-shek's Air Force we did not go by the short coast route, but made a wide detour.

In the course of the flight we crossed another great flooded area, due, I gathered, to the overflow of a lake. One of my colleagues checked the time and noted that it took a full hour to cross the area, which means that the floods extended for 200 miles. This was the third big flooded area we had seen. Hundreds of thousands of people must be involved, yet this is not considered one of the serious flood years.

CRITICISM OF VISIT

I understand that during our absence there has been considerable criticism of our visit, not only in America, where recognition of a country is apparently considered to be tantamount to approving a regime, but in Britain. As far as I am concerned, I am quite unrepentant. I think that the visit was well timed and is likely to improve relations between our peoples and to help toward world peace. It was, I think, a useful follow-up after Geneva. I have found that the people who know China well and have had long experience in the Far East agree with this view.

I hope that the relaxation of tension which we observed during our visit, will continue and that intercourse between the Chinese and Western peoples will expand.