AN AMERICAN REPORT
ON
THE RUSSIAN FAMINE

Findings
of the
Russian Commission
of the
Near East Relief

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New York

15 Cents
a Copy
25,000,000 people are facing starvation.

9,000,000 children are without food.

Only a few have been reached and many of them will perish in the harsh Russian winter.

The starving Russian workers and peasants, their wives and children, appeal to America to save them from death.

The Friends of Soviet Russia is the foremost relief organization in the United States. The money it collects is used for the purchase of food to be sent direct to the Soviet Government to be distributed as it sees fit. By January 1st it will have collected $300,000. It has set itself the goal of $500,000 by February 15.

You will not let the Russian workers starve while there is food in America to give them.

You will not let them freeze while there are clothes in America to cover them.

You still have enough. You must sacrifice something for the sake of our suffering brothers and sisters.

Make a donation—then a larger one—and send it without delay to the

THE FRIENDS OF SOVIET RUSSIA
201 WEST 13th STREET NEW YORK CITY

Clothes to 429 East 8th St., New York City.

Read "Soviet Russia," the organ of the Friends of Soviet Russia. Subscription price, $2.50 per year.
An American Report on the Russian Famine

I. THE COMMISSION

ORGANIZATION OF THE COMMISSION

On August 1, 1921, a party of Americans then en route from New York to Transcaucasia to make a survey of conditions in Transcaucasia for the Near East Relief, came into possession of a quantity of new information respecting famine conditions in the Volga district of Russia which greatly impressed them with the very serious need which might, if the reports received were substantiated, affect the lives of several millions of people in Russia. It was learned, at the same time, that a movement was on foot in the United States to undertake a limited amount of relief work among the children and the sick of the Volga district of Russia.

While the conditions upon which it was proposed to undertake this relief work were not known, and while it was self-evident that no member of this party could in any sense whatever presume to represent any organization or organizations planning to undertake relief work in Russia—and much less of course the American Government—in investigating conditions in Russia, the American party in question found itself peculiarly fortunately situated to be able to obtain first-hand information of conditions in the famine district of Russia, with the least possible delay, and to place whatever information might thus be obtained at the disposal of Mr. Herbert Hoover, as head of the American Relief Administration, should he desire it, or of any other American agency which might subsequently undertake relief work in this district; at the same time placing before the American public an impartial account of conditions in Russia as observed by Americans entirely without interest or bias.

With this in view, three members of the American party in question—Mr. Albert A. Johnson, Captain Paxton Hibben, F. A., R. C., and Mr. Frank Connes—on the arrival of the American party in Tiflis on August 4, 1921, approached the authorities of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia, the local representative of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, Mr.
Legran, and Morris Lisofsky, chief of the political section of
the XI Russian Army, with a view to securing permission from
the Soviet authorities of Russia for such a voluntary, unofficial
mission of Americans to proceed to the famine district of Rus-
ia, and to make a survey of conditions there, and to report
thereon to such American body or bodies as might be interested
in receiving such a report, and to the American people. Having
made these overtures, the American party thereupon proceeded
to Armenia, where a survey of famine conditions in that coun-
try was made.

On the return of the American party to Tiflis on August 11,
a reply was received from Moscow, through the Georgian Soviet
authorities, accepting in principle the suggestion of an unofficial
American commission to conduct a survey of conditions in the
famine district of Russia, and requesting that the names of
those who would form such commission be forwarded to Moscow.
No conditions of any kind were made as to the work of the
commission, the route it was to follow, or the extent or nature
of any report it might see fit to make.

A commission was therefore formed, to be known as The Rus-
sian Commission of the Near East Relief, organized on August
12, 1921, as follows:

Chairman: Albert A. Johnson, Director of the New York
State Institute of Applied Agriculture; Farmingdale, N. Y.

Secretary: Paxton Hibben, Captain, F. A., R. C., a Secretary
of the American Embassy at Petrograd, Russia, 1905-1906;
Fellow of the Royal and the American Geographical Societies;
Chevalier of the Order of St. Stanislas of Russia; Indianapolis,
Indiana.

Treasurer: E. A. Yarrow, Captain, A. R. C., Director Gen-
eral of the Near East Relief in Transcaucasia, succeeding
Colonel Wm. N. Haskell in that post in July, 1920, who had
served with the American Red Cross in Siberia during the war;
Binghamton, N. Y.

Frank Connes, official interpreter of the Supreme Court of
the State of New York, who had served in the American Red
Cross in Russia during the war; New York City, N. Y.

John R. Voris, Associate General Secretary of the Near East
Relief; Yonkers, N. Y.

The purpose of the Commission in visiting Russia was for-
mally stated as follows:

OBJECT. The object of the Commission is to assemble infor-
4
information as to economic conditions and reputed destitution in Russia, in cooperation with the Russian Government, with a view to placing this information, when gathered, before such American organization or organizations as might be designated to represent the American people in extending relief to Russia; or if no such organization be designated, to place the findings of the Commission before the American people through whatever channels may be available. The Commission understands that while this action has been taken in an emergency, and in order to take advantage of an unusual opportunity for investigation offered by the Russian Government, the Near East Relief in naming this Commission has no thought of projecting either its name or its operations into new territory.

Each member of the Commission was furnished with a certificate signed by Charles V. Vickrey as General Secretary of the Near East Relief, stating that the bearer had "been designated as a member of the special mission of the Near East Relief to investigate reported destitution caused by crop failures in Russia and to make recommendations as to methods of rendering relief." As all the members of the Commission had surrendered their American passports to the American consular officers in Constantinople, the members of the Commission possessed no credentials whatever, either from the American Government or from any American individual or body, official or unofficial, save the credentials herein mentioned, issued by the General Secretary of the Near East Relief. Passports were issued to each member of the Commission, however, and a general mandate covering the entire Commission, by the Socialist Soviet Government of Georgia.

By cables sent on August 12, 1921, by Mr. Charles V. Vickrey, General Secretary of the Near East Relief, and Mr. Albert A. Johnson, Chairman of the Commission, Mr. Herbert Hoover was advised of the action which had been taken in creating the Commission, and the task which the Commission had undertaken to perform. No reply from Mr. Hoover was ever received by the Commission.

**EXTENT OF THE INVESTIGATION**

The Commission left Tiflis, Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia, on August 16, 1921, returning to the same point after an absence of 27 days on September 12, 1921. The journey was made in a private car supplied by the Georgian Soviet authori-
ties, without cost to the Commission. The itinerary followed was fixed by the Commission, without suggestion of any kind by the Soviet authorities of Russia, and was as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug. 16-17.</td>
<td>Tiflis—Baku</td>
<td>515 versts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-20.</td>
<td>Baku—Rostov-on-Don</td>
<td>1,325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Rostov-on-Don—Voronezh</td>
<td>613</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Voronezh—Moscow</td>
<td>552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28-29.</td>
<td>Moscow—Roozaivka</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29-30.</td>
<td>Roozaivka—Samara</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Samara—Novo Semeykina</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Novo Semeykina—Samara</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Samara—Syzran</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept. 1-2.</td>
<td>Syzran—Penza</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Penza—Rtistschevo</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4.</td>
<td>Rtistschevo—Tavoljanka</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Tavoljanka—Povorino</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Povorino—Kalmyk</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5.</td>
<td>Povorino—Tsaritsin</td>
<td>343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7.</td>
<td>Tsaritsin—Tikhorietskaya</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8-11.</td>
<td>Tikhorietskaya—Baku</td>
<td>1,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-12.</td>
<td>Baku—Tiflis</td>
<td>515</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7,295 versts
or 4,863 miles

The following geographical subdivisions of the Russian Confederation were covered by the Commission directly, by personal observation on the spot:

Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic of Adjaria
Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia
Socialist Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan
Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic of Daghestan
Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic of Gorsk

States of: Stavropol Moscow
           Kuban-Black Sea Penza
           Don Simbirsk
           Kharkov Samara
           Voronezh Saratov
           Tambov Tsaritsin
           Ryazin Astrakhan
Information as to conditions in the following geographical subdivisions of the Russian Confederation was secured by personal questioning of inhabitants thereof:

States of: Tula
     Vyatka

Kursk
     Ufa

Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic of Chubask
Autonomous Tartar Socialist Soviet Republic (Kazan)
Autonomous Socialist Soviet Republic of Kirghez
Socialist Soviet Republic of Turkestan

The following higher officials of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic were questioned by the Commission:

Chief Commissar Kamenev of the state of Moscow, Chairman of the official Russian Relief Commission
People’s Commissar for Foreign Trade, L. Krassin
People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, G. Chicherin
People’s Acting Commissar for Labor, A. Anixt
People’s Acting Commissar for Agriculture, Gregorovitch
Chief of the Russian Commission for the Purchase of Railway Supplies Abroad, and former Director General of Russian Railways, Prof. George Lomonossoff
Chief of the Anglo-American Bureau of the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Gregory Weinstein
Chief Commissar of the state of Samara, Vladimir Sokolsky
Chief Commissar of the state of Tsaritsin, Ivan Maximov Marosov
President of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia, B. Mdivani
People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia, Alexander Svanidze
Chief of the Political Section of the XI Russian Army, Morris Lisofsky

Cable reports of its observations were made by the Commission to Mr. Hoover on August 22, and to the Near East Relief on August 25 and 29 and September 7.

The total expenditures of the Commission, exclusive of the cost of the stock of food, the property of the Near East Relief, which was taken with the Commission for its use, from August 16 to September 12, 1921, were $98.95.
II. THE SITUATION

THE DISTRICTS AND PEOPLE AFFECTED BY FAMINE

The merest cursory survey of the Volga River valley furnishes convincing evidence of the existence of acute famine conditions affecting a very large number of people. Little or no food is displayed for sale in the markets, and the prices asked for bread, where bread can be obtained at all, are prohibitive:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Per pfund (14 ounces)</th>
<th>Black bread</th>
<th>Rye bread</th>
<th>White bread</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In Samara: Rubles</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Syzran:</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>4,500</td>
<td>6,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Tsaritsin:</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dried Volga fish sell at 3,425 rubles per pound (English). Sugar and butter are generally unobtainable. Saccharine sells at 10,000 rubles per gramme. Acorns, from which bread flour is made, sell at 1,600 rubles per pound. In the famine district itself no meat is to be had at all, while even in the neighboring districts little is encountered, and at very high prices. Only fruit and melons are abundant, and literally thousands of people were found living on watermelons, unweaned babies being given the rind to suck. In many places a bush possessing a succulent bark—in appearance not unlike the locust, but unfamiliar to the members of the Commission—was found to have been stripped of its bark and the bark eaten, and women and children were observed stripping this bark off and eating the same.

The bread eaten by the peasants in the villages and tasted by the Commission is generally made of acorn flour mixed with "soosak," a species of marsh grass said to contain a certain amount of nourishment, and pig-weed seed and sunflower seed flour. It is hard and black and on exposure to the air becomes almost stony in consistence. Many of the draft animals upon which the peasants must depend to draw their plows, if any cultivation is to be done next spring, have already been killed and eaten, and unquestionably a very large percentage of all the draft animals in the famine district will so be killed, or will have died of starvation, before the season for spring planting begins.

Literally hundreds of thousands of people have left and are still leaving their homes throughout the districts affected by the famine, piling a few belongings on wagons and traveling as far as their horses will carry them, then killing and eating
their horses and continuing afoot in an effort born of panic to escape the trap of hunger and approaching winter. In the city of Samara 16,000 such refugees, not only from the state of Samara but from that of Ufa and from the Autonomous Republics of Chubask and Kazan, had congregated in the neighborhood of the railway station and along the banks of the Volga, where they were encamped, for the most part without means of any kind, awaiting transportation to take them elsewhere. In every Volga city the situation was the same, while at Tsaritsin, the point at which those who have come down the Volga in boats seek to escape by rail, the concentration of destitute and helpless people is incredible. Two hundred had been officially registered as dead of starvation in Tsaritsin in the second fortnight of August, and conditions were not improving. Chief People’s Commissar Marosov, of the state of Tsaritsin, stated to this Commission that by the first of January next there would be no food whatever for the 1,500,000 inhabitants of the state, without outside aid. Chief People’s Commissar Sokolsky, of the state of Samara, informed this Commission that in the month of August 588,000 people, including 50,000 children, were wholly dependent upon the state for food, and he asserted that the stock of available food in the state could not last beyond the end of November. The observations of this Commission tend to confirm these statements.

In the estimation of this Commission the situation in Russia today is a very serious one. Its consequences may be far reaching and entirely unforeseen. It is not the province of this Commission to speculate on what these consequences may be, but the members of this Commission are profoundly convinced that a situation exists in Russia, due primarily to the famine, which impels the serious consideration of the rest of the world.

The districts affected by acute famine conditions are for the most part situated in the valley of the Volga River, comprising approximately 600,000 square miles of the principal grain-growing territory of Europe. North to south, they appear to be the following:

The four southern counties of the state of Vyatka
The Autonomous Chubask Territory
The Autonomous Tartar Socialist Soviet Republic of Kazan
The western portion of the state of Ufa
The states of Simbirsk, Samara, Saratov, Tsaritsin, and Astrakhan
The northeastern section of the state of the Don
The districts include some 20,000,000 inhabitants, 85 per cent of whom are peasant farmers. They are serious, diligent, sober, and frugal people, among whom relatively few are Communists or even understand what is meant by communism, or "bolshevism," albeit many of these peasant communities have held their land for generations on a communistic basis of tenure. They are not as a rule in any way actively hostile to the present Government of Russia, but are on the other hand law-abiding people inclined to accept any established government. They regard the present Government of Russia as an established government, and anticipate no change.

The education of these people has, in the past, been almost entirely neglected and they are in consequence superstitious and easily impressionable, which makes it the more difficult for the Government to deal with the state of panic which has resulted from the famine. Even now, education among them is being effected to any appreciable extent only through teaching the young men during the period of their military service, and while this is being effectively carried out, its result upon the general state of ignorance of the peasant farmers is not as yet very widespread, and a considerable time must elapse before the effects of this type of education can be felt throughout the community.

The agricultural methods employed by the peasant farmers in this region are backward and inadequate, but by no means so primitive as those employed in Transcaucasia and Turkey. The old-fashioned three-field system is in general use, and neither proper rotation of crops nor dry farming are in any way generally practiced—indeed, dry farming is virtually unknown among them, though the need for it is obvious. Efforts are being made, however, by the Soviet Government to teach modern farming methods. This Commission inspected an agricultural education train which had been sent out from Moscow into the farming district. It contained special cars for lectures, practical demonstrations of agricultural machinery of modern type, and a certain amount of seed for distribution for experimental purposes. This Commission also encountered, in a small village, a group of men sent out from village to village by the People's Commissariat for Education, in connection with a theatrical troupe to draw crowds, who urged the farmers to remain on their land despite the menace of famine, and made it clear to them how necessary it was that the maximum crop pos-
sible be planted this fall and next spring, if a repetition of famine conditions was not to be anticipated next year. The Soviet Government also conducts, with the machines at its disposal, tractor demonstrations, plowing large tracts of land for the peasants without regard to field boundaries, employing for this purpose numbers of the larger type, old-fashioned, English and Swedish five to eight plow tractors.

It is of course obvious that very little more can be done, practically, in the way of general agricultural education of the peasant farmers, until the principal obstacle of illiteracy has been removed. It should be added, however, that the farmers are eager for agricultural education and quick to adapt themselves to modern methods when the necessary machinery is made available.

**CROP CONDITIONS**

According to statistics furnished by the People's Commissariat for Agriculture, in 32 Russian states exclusive of the Ukraine, comprising 853,931,178.85 acres, there are only 170,776,076.432 acres (22 per cent) of plowed land, while 31,378,352.62 additional acres are fit for cultivation but have not yet been put under the plow, while at the same time a considerable part of the 89,642,803.7 acres in the same area, now employed as pasture, might also be considered as land available for cultivation at need.

With so great a reserve of uncultivated arable land the question imposes itself why there should be a famine in Russia at all. Certain facts appear upon examination.

1. **In Respect of Russia as a Whole**

Throughout Russia there has been a very marked falling off in grain production since the beginning of the war, and especially since 1916. Comparative figures in this connection are of little value since the acreage of Russia as a whole has been materially altered by the war and the terms of peace.

2. **In Respect of Twenty-four Grain Producing States**

In twenty-four states, taking the figures of 1916 as normal of the acreage planted in food products (43,516,042 acres), while in 1917, 101.3 per cent of this acreage was planted, in 1919 only 86.3 per cent and in 1920 only 75.5 per cent of this acreage was planted.
3. In Respect of the Famine Area

While in the famine area before the war some 37,762,000 acres, or approximately 10 per cent of the total area, were sown, in 1920 in the same area only about 18,886,000 acres were sown.

4. In Respect of the State of Samara

In Samara, the largest of the states affected by the famine, lying in the center of the famine district, out of 37,772,000 acres of arable land of which only 29.8 per cent (10,792,000 acres) was even normally under cultivation, in 1920 only 40 per cent of this acreage (4,316,800 acres) was planted, or less than 12 per cent of the total available arable land. In this state virtually all the land has been divided up among the peasants, of whom there are approximately 2,500,000 in the state, roughly 75 acres of arable land being thus allocated to each peasant family.

The striking figures in these comparisons are those exhibiting the small proportion of the land which had ever been cultivated, even before the war. In the state of Samara, for example, less than 30 per cent of the arable land was under the plow even in normal years, while in 32 states of European Russia only 22 per cent of the land had been plowed at any period.

This general lack of cultivation has, of course, two direct bearings on the present famine:

1. It is clear that there was, as a rule, no considerable reserve production of grain in Russia, even before the war, against possible famine years. It would not ordinarily be possible simply by placing an embargo on grain export to insure a sufficient reserve of grain to tide over any famine period comfortably, because the grain export of Russia appears to have been merely the disposal of an industry either for self-protection or for maximum profit. If this is true, as seems to be the case, in good years Russia exported large quantities of foodstuffs while in bad years famine conditions were the normal result of a lack of prevision characteristic both of the former national government and of the peasants themselves.

Under these circumstances it is scarcely astonishing that the revolution in Russia worked no miracle in this respect, and famine followed as certainly adverse climatic conditions under the Soviet Government as under the former Imperial Govern-
ment. Not the form of government but lack of economic organization was at fault.

2. Even had it been the intention of the new Government to stimulate an increased production of the land, it was obviously powerless to accomplish this because the agricultural equipment available in Russia had never been more than sufficient to cultivate more than about 30 per cent of the arable land, and first during the war and later owing to the economic blockade of Russia it was not only impossible to add to this equipment but impossible also to maintain the equipment already existing in a state of repair. In a word, since 1914 Russia's agricultural production had been slowly undergoing an inexorable process of enforced attrition. It was inevitable, therefore, that when a bad year did arrive, the suffering would be the more intense and the powerlessness of the country to help itself the more evident. That is the case today.

To this result various factors have contributed.

1. Former Limited Peasant Land Tenures

Before the war the average holding of the peasant family (whether owned or rented is immaterial) was about 8 acres. By the system then in vogue the peasant holding, say, 8 acres of a landlord was compelled to cultivate a similar amount for his landlord in lieu of rent. When, however, by his industry and frugality a peasant had been able to increase his holdings —increasing also the amount of land he must cultivate for his landlord thereby—a point was automatically reached at which he must make a very considerable new capital investment in agricultural machinery if he was to continue to increase the land under his cultivation. This additional capital investment the Russian peasant was rarely ever able to make, and in consequence instead of leasing more land and cultivating it himself on a larger scale, with modern farm machinery, he leased or purchased more land and then sublet it, thus becoming not a large tenant farmer but a small landlord. The significance of this fact lay in its automatically keeping cultivation down to the small farm stage—sickles, scythes, hand binding, threshing with flails, etc.—thus employing a vast number of persons for a relatively inconsiderable grain production, and so keeping two-thirds of the arable land of the country uncultivated. A peasant family rarely held over twenty-five acres and in a very few instances were the peasants equipped, single handed, to
cultivate even that much. Merely increasing the peasant holdings to 75 acres per family therefore benefited neither the peasants themselves nor the population of Russia as a whole, since neither farming implements, draft animals, nor even man power were available to put the additional land allotments under the plow.

This fact is cardinal, for taken in conjunction with the war which limited the imports of Russia to war materials and the economic blockade which cut them off altogether, it makes clear the reason why the division of the land among the peasants failed to increase production of food products in Russia. On the contrary, the figures just cited reveal that food production in Russia has actually decreased since 1917. This also is readily accounted for.

2. Inability to Increase Agricultural Equipment

For seven years the imports of agricultural machinery, spare parts for repairs, tractors to take the place of draft animals used for war purposes, and power machinery to replace the loss of man power due not only to the losses by war but to the fact that some of the most densely populated sections of Russia have been ceded to other countries—Poland, Rumania, Latvia, Lithuania, etc.—by the terms of the various peaces entered into by Russia, have been negligible. In this period the depreciation of any agricultural machinery, even with the best of care (which in Russia it has not) is so great as to render it virtually useless, and the loss from the sum total of agricultural machinery existing in 1914, when open importation ceased, is of necessity, and has actually been, in rapid progression year by year as the material for repairs has not been available. It is the opinion of this Commission that Russia today is in need of at least $500,000,000 worth of agricultural machinery, and that, without a very considerable immediate importation of machinery, cultivation in Russia, never more than 30 per cent of the arable land and in 1920 only about 75 per cent of that, will dwindle with the greatest possible rapidity. The consequences of this upon the food supply of Europe need no definition.

3. Destruction of Agricultural Equipment

It is the impression of this Commission that the world in visualizing the situation which exists in Russia today is inclined to forget that Russia has been in a state of almost continuous warfare for the past seven years. It is not the province
of this Commission to discuss why this has been true in Russia nor to attempt to fix the responsibility therefor; it is, nevertheless, a fact that war has scarcely ceased so far as Russia is concerned since 1914, with all that this implies of destruction, of exhaustion of material resources and human resources, and, with the economic blockade which has existed since 1917, of practical impossibility to repair the exhaustion of material resources which has been the direct result of the blockade in question.

The present famine district of Russia suffered with peculiar severity from this state of affairs. Not only was it expected to supply the food, the men, and the horses, always to one and frequently to both warring armies, but it became on occasions the actual field of combat of the struggling forces, suffering in consequence the same damages that were suffered in northwest France and in Belgium, with this important difference, namely, that after the armistice in 1918 the enemy countries were by the armistice terms compelled to, and the Allied countries voluntarily hastened to, come to the aid of France and Belgium in their reconstruction, while in Russia not only was this not the case but one military expedition after another launched against Russia merely served to continue and complete the work of destruction which the war had begun. Thus in 1918 the states of Samara and Ufa, both in the famine area, were the fighting ground of the Czecho-Slovaks, the city of Samara was partially sacked by them, and in the very heart of the present famine region draft animals were seized and carried away while farm machinery and farms alike were destroyed. In 1919 the army of Admiral Kolchak penetrated to within twenty miles of the city of Samara and was compelled to retire only by a general uprising of the peasants of Samara, Simbirsk, and Saratov and after a desperate struggle. The fields of this district are still cut up with defensive intrenchments, artillery emplacements, and barbed-wire entanglements, toward the northeast against Kolchak and toward the south against Denikin. And while Ufa and Samara and Vyatka were the fighting ground for the Kolchak armies and the Czecho-Slovaks, on the south the states of Tsaritsin, the Don, and Astrakhan—all within the present famine area—furnished the battlefields for the Denikin forces, operating there as late as 1920. In both areas buildings are destroyed, railway stations razed, water tanks and bridges burned, and means of communication greatly damaged.
Between these two areas, the states of Simbirsk and Saratov during some 18 months of civil war constituted the rear areas of armies engaged in active hostilities. They were the natural source of supply of these armies, and their store of grain and draft animals were seized first by one side in the civil struggle and then by the other, and their men were impressed into the service of both armies while the war was in progress in that country, and were retained in the military service when, last year, the field of combat shifted first to Poland and then to the Crimea. In the matter of draft animals alone, for example, while throughout Russia the number of draft animals decreased between 1916 and 1920 by 16 per cent, in the famine area this percentage of decrease was enormously augmented by the actual presence of war in that region. Yet a decrease in the number of draft animals means definitely a decrease in amount of cultivation.

4. The Droughts of 1920 and 1921

In 1920, the very year of the cessation of civil war in the famine area itself—and while war was still in progress with Poland on the northwest and with the Wrangel armies on the southwest—a drought, said to have been quite as severe as that of 1911, further reduced the output of an already reduced area of cultivation in a country whose losses in man power had been vastly in excess of those of any other country in Europe during the European war and whose armies still demanded the bulk of the youth of the country for service at the front. In the fall of 1920, in the state of Samara it was found possible to put under cultivation only 1,483,900 acres out of a total of 37,772,000 acres of arable land in that state; and owing partially to the drought of that year and to the shallow plowing, a direct result of lack of draft animals and shortage of man power, only 44 pounds of grain were harvested per acre instead of the usual output of 934 pounds per acre for fall planting. In April of this year a still severer drought made itself manifest in the whole Volga region. The following table of comparative climatic conditions between this year and the average of the previous seventeen years, in the state of Samara in the heart of the famine district, furnishes the details:
### Average temperature (centigrade) of the air:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average of past 17 years</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>13.</td>
<td>15.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>9.18</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>24.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Average temperature (centigrade) of the soil:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average of past 17 years</th>
<th>1921</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6.</td>
<td>17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>13.</td>
<td>25.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Average rainfall (millimeters):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average of past 17 years</th>
<th>1921</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.</td>
<td>38.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Evaporation (millimeters):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Average of past 17 years</th>
<th>1921</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>55</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures require no comment. The results of the excessive heat and lack of moisture are obvious to anyone visiting the famine country. The land is parched. All vegetation has been burned up. In the few fields where any grain has appeared at all the sparse and stunted plants would not pay cutting, save in the event of a desperate lack of food; in this instance these plants have been carefully cut, even one by one, and what few grains of wheat, rye, or barley they bore have been painstakingly harvested by hand.

This spring, due to the causes above set forth, only 2,832,900 acres were sown in the state of Samara, and the product on account of the drought has been only 120 pounds per acre as against a normal of 1,334 pounds per acre for spring sowing. The total grain produced in the state of Samara this year has been approximately only 70,000 tons, while the minimum food requirements (14 ounces per day per person) are 399,406 tons and the seed requirements 539,600 tons, a total of 939,006 tons of grain for this one state, leaving a deficit of 669,006 tons in Samara alone.

### The Seed Problem

While it is necessary that the peasant farmers of the Volga region shall eat until next year's crop shall be harvested, it is quite as essential that there shall be a crop next year to be harvested; and without seed grain this is, of course, impossible. It must be borne in mind that the seed problem in Russia today is but one of several problems which it is the purpose of this Report to present and which, combined, constitute the present problem of Russia as a food producing country, not alone for
Russia, but for the whole of Europe. The immediate food problem has been presented. Famine conditions now exist in a territory comprising some 20,000,000 inhabitants and which, in normal times, constitutes the grain reservoir of Russia. Mere relief sufficient to tide the inhabitants of the famine area over until next year is worse than useless. Unless at least the minimum acreage planted in the fall of 1920 and the spring of 1921 is planted again for next summer’s harvest, another famine year must inevitably follow, and the situation a year hence be as bad as today, or worse.

It is the observation of this Commission that there is no tendency whatever on the part of the peasant farmers of Russia voluntarily to reduce their production to a minimum, for any reason whatever. They are today, and they have been throughout, eager to cultivate the maximum land at their disposition and for the cultivation of which they still have equipment. This Commission is well aware that this finding may upset a preconceived idea of the situation in Russia today which is current abroad. It is, however, true that this Commission has seen the land being plowed and sown in the heart of the famine area, in anticipation of a crop next year, when those who were plowing and sowing the land in question were actually living on bread made of flour of acorns, “soosak,” sunflower seeds, and millet and when they were consciously facing a failure of even this inadequate form of nourishment by January 1, 1922. This Commission wishes to record here its conviction that the gradual decrease of the area of cultivation in Russia has been due to the causes herein set forth, namely, to the old system of land tenures which automatically limited the agricultural equipment of the country; to the inability of the peasant farmer for the past seven years to increase his agricultural equipment; to the depreciation and destruction of agricultural equipment, loss of draft animals, and lack of manpower due to war conditions; and, finally, to the droughts of 1920 and 1921; and that it has not been due in any appreciable measure to a voluntary reduction of production on the part of the farmers themselves, for whose industry and courage in the face of adversity this Commission has the highest admiration.

The seed problem, then, is a very vital one, for it is certain that if the seed is available it will be sown, and it is equally certain that unless at least the minimum acreage is sown this
year, another famine year must follow this one in Russia.

Now to sow the minimum acreage in the famine area—that of this year, which has proved so inadequate, namely 18,886,000 acres—will require some 944,300 tons of seed grain at the rate of 100 pounds per acre which, by the prevailing old-fashioned and wasteful agricultural methods in Russia, may be regarded as a minimum. It is not the thought of this Commission that more than this minimum—say 1,000,000 tons—need be sown; but it should not be lost sight of that grain production in Russia has fallen this year from pre-war production, while in Samara, for example, only 40 per cent of the normal acreage was sown for this year's crop.

Of this amount—1,000,000 tons—according to Commissar Kamenev, Russia can furnish 162,000 tons. This figure may be questioned, since it is impossible in mid-August for Commissar Kamenev to know save by conjecture how much seed grain the Soviet Government might be able to collect from the remainder of the country for the benefit of the famine area. But even assuming this figure, 838,000 tons of seed grain would still be required to plant a minimum acreage in the famine area.

It is not a question of prolonging a state of starvation, but of getting out of the woods. According to Commissar Kamenev, at the rate of about 12 ounces of grain per day per person, 1,260,000 tons of grain will be required to feed the people of the Volga region for 10 months from October to next harvest. Of this amount, Russia, he claims, can furnish about one-fourth, leaving 945,000 tons to be supplied from outside Russia, if at all. That it must be supplied from outside Russia is evident from the fact that starvation already exists in the Volga region.

The grain requirements of the Volga region would therefore appear to be 838,000 tons for seed and 945,000 tons for food, or a total of 1,783,000 tons in all, to see the country through to next harvest and to have a reasonable assurance that next year's crop will not be merely a prelude to another famine.

It must be clear that the consequences of failure to furnish approximately this amount of grain, as a minimum, from sources outside Russia, are inevitable, and may be stated briefly as follows:

1. If less than the requisite amount of seed grain is ren-
dered available, there will perforce be a still further shrink-
age of the acreage planted, with the unavoidable result of
another crop shortage in 1922.

2. If, on the other hand, provision is not made that a suffi-
cient supply of grain for food purposes be on hand, in addition
to the supply intended for seed—and the peasants convinced
that this has been done—either part of the seed grain in-
tended for next spring's planting will be eaten before the end
of winter, or a large part of the peasant population, seeing
no hope of being able to live through the winter in the famine
area, will pack up their belongings and migrate. In the for-
mer event, the area of cultivation next year will be quite as
surely reduced as if sufficient seed had not been secured, while
in the second event by the time for spring planting the area
that can be planted will be reduced by the lack of man power
to plant it, due to the migration of the farmers.

Migrations

Migrations of the kind just mentioned are already taking place
from the famine area, and on a very large scale. From Baku
to Moscow and from Samara to Astrakhan, this Commission
saw literally hundreds of thousands of families on the move, by
train, by Volga steamers, by wagon, and afoot. Along one
road, in a few hours the Commission counted 83 families in
wagons bound for the state of Kharkov, in the Ukraine. From
the railway junction of Tikhorietskaya, in the state of Kuban-
Black Sea, well outside the famine area, this Commission saw
three trains daily, loaded to the very utmost with refugees, with
car roofs, bumpers, brake beams, couplers, and the sides and
cow-catchers of the engines incredibly jammed with fleeing
people. In the estimation of this Commission, based not only
upon its observation along the entire way of its journey, but
from questioning villagers in the famine area and refugees
along the road, that fully 3,000,000 persons are already on the
move. It may be added that with the exception of those being
moved by the Soviet Government, by train, to previously chosen
points in regions where this year's harvest has not been too
poor, none of these wretched people fleeing from famine has any
definite objective, or any idea what he can do to sustain life
when he arrives at the end of his journey.

The consequences of a further spread of these aimless and
senseless migrations need no defining. They are bound to have
at least two obvious results: (1) To depopulate the Volga region itself, and so leave an insufficient number of people in that region to put in and harvest next year's crop; (2) to over-populate the regions invaded by these migrations, where there is little or no surplus food, thus merely serving to bring hunger upon the entire population of Russia, instead of upon one district.

At first reluctant to admit that these migrations were actually taking place, the Central Soviet Government finally, toward the end of August, took effective direction of them and began to provide as much transportation as possible to take people from the great centers of concentration, at Samara, Syzran, Saratov, Tsaritsin, and Rostov-on-Don, and send them in orderly fashion into the Ukraine, to Siberia, to the states of Kuban-Black Sea and Stavropol, to the Autonomous Kirghiz and Gorsk Republics and into the Socialist Soviet Republics of Daghestan and Azerbaijan. It being evident that it was then too late to bring food to those on the point of leaving their homes, the Soviet Government appears to have adopted the policy of taking the famine sufferers to the food.

This was, perhaps, the only course that could be followed under the circumstances. But it is evident that it was a measure of mere temporary expediency, which not only offered no real solution of the problem created by the famine, but rendered any constructive solution thereof the more difficult by the scattering of the people to be aided.

**SUMMARY OF THE SITUATION**

Briefly the situation in respect to the famine may be summarized as follows:

1. In the district defined as the Volga region, with a population of some 20,000,000 people, between 10,000,000 and 12,000,000 people are now suffering from hunger, the result of a famine.

2. This famine has been the inevitable and logical outcome of (a) a lack of any system of maintaining a sufficient food reserve in Russia; and
(b) the inability of Russia during the past seven years to increase agricultural production, or to stem the unavoidable decrease in agricultural production due to (1) the relatively small amount of available agricultural equipment owing to the former system of limited land tenures;
(2) the impossibility during the war and the economic blockade which followed the war to increase or replace this agricultural equipment;

(3) the destruction of agricultural equipment, draft animals, and man power by seven years of war; and

(4) the droughts of 1920 and 1921.

3. According to the best available information, in order to enable the famine district to plant and harvest a normal crop next year and to enable the population of the famine district to remain on their farms to plant and harvest this crop, at least 1,783,000 tons of grain not now available in Russia are necessary.

4. In default of this aid, or the promise of it, there are now a very large number of people—probably as many as 3,000,000—who have left their homes in the famine district and are today refugees wandering at random over Russia, seeking a food surplus to sustain them which does not exist in Russia, but which does exist in Rumania and Bulgaria.

CONDITIONS IN TRANSCAUCASIAN RUSSIA

That portion of the former Russian Empire lying south of the Caucasus Mountains, whose independence of Russia was declared on April 22, 1918, and which, as the three Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia led a precarious existence as sovereign states for some four years, is now formed into three Socialist Soviet Republics, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, and three autonomous Socialist Soviet states, Adjaria, Avkhasia, and Nakhitchevan, all federated with the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic. From August 2, 1921, to August 11, 1921, this Commission had, before proceeding to Russia proper, made the following tour of inspection of this district:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aug.</th>
<th>Route</th>
<th>Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>Batum, Adjaria—Tiflis, Georgia</td>
<td>327 versts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6</td>
<td>Tiflis—Erivan, Armenia</td>
<td>294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-7</td>
<td>Erivan—Etchmiadzin, Armenia</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Etchmiadzin—Erivan</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-8</td>
<td>Erivan—Alexandropol, Armenia</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Villages of Schoragul Plain</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Alexandropol—Karakliss, Armenia</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-11</td>
<td>Karakliss—Tiflis, Georgia</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total .................................. 1,001 versts
or 668 miles
The conditions in this district had been found shocking, indeed far worse than present conditions in the Volga district of Russia. Especially was this true of the Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia, which had been the battlefield of the Russian Transcaucasian and the Imperial Ottoman armies from 1914 until the break-up of the former army in the fall of 1917, following the November Revolution. Into this district, during the military operations of the early years of the war, some 585,000 Armenian refugees from the Armenian vilayets of Turkey had poured and remained destitute from that time forward, succored only by such aid as was furnished by the American Relief Administration and the Near East Relief from 1919 to 1920, and by the Near East Relief alone since July, 1920. The Near East Relief is now caring for some 25,000 children in former Russian Transcaucasia—housing, clothing, feeding, and teaching them—as well as doing a large amount of general relief through the distribution of clothing, the maintenance of soup kitchens and hospitals. The relief furnished by this American organization is, however, far from adequate to meet the present needs of the situation created by the Turkish invasion of Armenia in November, 1920. According to official figures there are 120,000 people in a starving condition in Armenia and 60,000 starving women and children in Georgia. The Near East Relief has been requested by the two governments concerned to aid, by an extensive program of general relief, in meeting this situation; but for lack of funds it has been unable to do so.

The immediate cause of the present acute famine situation in Armenia was the destruction of some 140 villages by the invading Turks, from which the populations were driven and whence all beasts of burden, agricultural and household implements, and furniture were removed by the invaders. The evacuation of this portion of Armenia did not take place until April 21, 1921, too late for any extensive crop to be put in, even had the peasants had the draft animals and the implements to plow and sow the ground, which they did not have. Of the original 585,000 Armenian refugees from Turkish Armenia there remained some 280,000 still unassimilated among the villages of the Armenian Republic, a charge upon the meager resources of the country. To this number the Turkish invasion added some 120,000, making a rough total of about 400,000 homeless refugees now facing winter without food in Armenia. Of these
approximately 50,000 are concentrated in the cities and towns of the country, while 350,000 are scattered through the rural districts where communications are difficult and where it will be very difficult to reach them with aid.

Of the 50,000 Armenians concentrated in cities and towns by far the greater part were actually in starving condition when observed by this Commission early in August. Children were lying dead in the streets and the sick and infirm were dying in great numbers daily. Cholera had set in and was making havoc, partly due to the reduced resistance to disease of those suffering from hunger. There were 68 registered cases of cholera in Erivan and 141 in Alexandropol the first week in August, and death was claiming 20 per cent of those affected. A special train of physicians and nurses had been sent from Moscow to help fight the epidemic.

People's Commissar for Relief, Tekezarian, of the Armenian Socialist Soviet Republic, informed this Commission that the Armenian Government had sought to purchase grain in Persia, but that the Persian Government, fearing a shortage, had placed an embargo on the shipment of grain out of the country. He estimated that 5,000 tons of grain per month would furnish those actually starving with enough grain to sustain life—about 14 ounces daily. For the ten months until next harvest this would be 50,000 tons of grain. It was his belief, in which this Commission does not share, that the Armenian Government would be able to obtain enough seed wheat from Persia to sow all the land which the peasants still possessed agricultural implements and draft animals to sow, next spring. However, as only about 6,250 tons of grain would be necessary to plant the Schoragul Plain, the principal grain growing area of Armenia as now constituted (125,000 acres), this is possible.

In addition, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Ascanas Mooravian, appealed to the Near East Relief to furnish second-hand clothing for the 400,000 homeless to see them through the rigors of the coming winter, and requested that organization to establish soup kitchens in the cities and towns to take care of those now sleeping in streets, parks, box cars, and under hedges, for whom no housing is available. Agricultural implements and tractors to replace the draft animals seized by the Turkish army are, of course, even more essential in Armenia than in Russia.

In the estimation of this Commission the situation in Ar-
menia is worse than the present situation in the Volga district of Russia. But it is also true that in a few months there will be little to choose between them. The situation in Armenia, however, is a smaller one and could be readily handled as an offshoot of any relief furnished Russia. This is especially true in view of the fact that there is now operating in Armenia a capable American relief organization, the Near East Relief, through whose instrumentality whatever relief Armenia may require could readily be administered. In the opinion of this Commission this relief may be thus summarized:

1. Fifty thousand tons of grain for food to enable the actual refugee population of Armenia to keep body and soul together until next harvest.

2. Six thousand two hundred and fifty tons of seed grain to enable the peasants of Armenia to sow at least a minimum crop next spring.

3. As much second-hand clothing as can be obtained and shipped to Armenia, for general distribution.

4. A proportion—say 5 per cent—of any agricultural machinery obtained for Russia to be allocated to Armenia.

III. THE REMEDIES

TEMPORARY MEASURES

There are of course two general methods of dealing with a situation of the nature of that which exists in Russia today: (1) It may be regarded as an isolated and ephemeral disaster, comparable to an earthquake or an epidemic, to be accorded a helping hand for the brief period of its greatest intensity. (2) It may be looked upon in its relation to the economic life of the rest of the world, and its consequences weighed not merely as affecting so many million inhabitants of the Volga Valley of Russia, temporarily suffering from famine, but as affecting the whole population of Europe whose bread supply in the past was in a very considerable measure dependent upon this very Volga Valley of Russia, and with whom both the present high cost of living and the international exchange difficulties are by no means unrelated to the cutting off of the grain supply from Russia.

In the former instance, the present situation in Russia may of course be regarded merely as an occasion for charity, and so
treated, while in the latter instance a perhaps deeper vision will look upon the 600,000 square miles of the grain land of the Volga Valley as an asset of all Europe, and indeed of the whole world, to be conserved if possible, and to be developed and extended if at all consistent with general political considerations.

In the first case the extent of the relief to be afforded, if any, depends upon no consideration save the desire of those who may wish to furnish relief to the suffering people of the famine area of Russia. For this purpose no further report would be required of this or any other Commission or individual than a report showing that a famine exists and that relief from without is requisite if a very great number of people are not to die. This is, of course, the case, and the report of this Commission so far has, it may be assumed, cited sufficient evidence to put this beyond the range of any question even by the most skeptical. Still further evidence is at the disposal of this Commission and can be cited at need.

But aid of this nature, however valuable, has and can have no relation to the broader problem which, thus far, has been generally appreciated in respect of the remainder of Europe but is not yet perhaps so widely considered as applying to Russia, namely, that there can be neither well-established peace nor recovery from the general effects of the war until every nation and every people whose economic life has been dislocated by war conditions has returned to a certain normalcy. It is not in the least a political question, nor does it matter under what form of government the fields of the Volga Valley are plowed and sown and harvested. What is vital, not to Russia alone, but to the rest of Europe and to the United States, upon which the economic support of those suffering from the effects of the war in the rest of Europe has already fallen, directly or indirectly, and will fall again, is that the fields of the Volga Valley shall be plowed and sown and harvested, and not permitted to revert to a desert through lack of foresight on the part of the Soviet Government of Russia or any other government. It goes without saying that emergency aid implies no definite, constructive program because no constructive aim is envisaged. It is and is bound to be a case of save as many from death as possible with a given sum, and let the future take care of itself. In the way of this sort of aid, certain things are now being done in Russia.
A. By the Soviet Government of Russia

1. The children are being fed, clothed, and housed, so far as the available resources of the government permit. In Samara, for example, 50,000 children are being housed, clothed, and fed by the Soviet Government. This Commission found them well cared for, cleanly housed but rather scantily clothed in cotton garments. They were receiving 7 ounces of bread per day, each, and soup with meat twice a week. At Syzran this Commission inspected a soup kitchen for children at which 7 ounces of bread and a tin of hot soup were supplied each child once daily. In Tsaritsin 20,000 children were being cared for in institutions, clothed as in Samara, and furnished 7 ounces of bread and 18 grammes of sugar daily, with meat or fish soup twice or thrice per week. At Nevinnomysskaya and other points the largest available buildings in the towns had been turned into orphanages and children's hospitals, while in Moscow the former School for the Daughters of the Nobility had been made an orphanage. These may be taken as characteristic examples.

2. A nation-wide propaganda is being conducted for the relief of the famine sufferers by all the means employed in the United States to collect money for welfare organizations during the war by special newspapers published in various centers by the Government, devoted wholly to the famine; by news dispatches sent out through the "Gubrosta," or Government news telegraph agency; and through local relief committees, or soviets. Deputations of peasants from the famine district have been and are now being sent out to the peasants of other districts where the crops have not been failures, to make a direct, personal appeal, peasant to peasant, for seed grain. Such a committee, or soviet, of peasants from the state of Tsaritsin secured 3,600 tons of seed wheat in this way.

3. The Soviet Government is levying and is actually collecting without difficulty in districts where crops have been sufficient to sustain life until next harvest a famine tax in kind which varies from 5 per cent to 15 per cent, according to the crop, the same to be used as seed as fast as it can be gathered and delivered direct to the points of greatest need. This Commission saw this contribution being brought in many villages by the peasants themselves, without compulsion of any kind, and saw the seed grain so gathered being delivered and stored at Samara, where 9,000 tons had already been received and issued
for seed purposes. This Commission was informed that 25,200 further tons of seed grain would be delivered in the state of Samara in this way, together with 18,000 additional tons of seed grain from Siberia; but is inclined to be skeptical of these figures. In the same way, the state of Kursk and the Urals have taxed their inhabitants 6,840 tons of grain which are to be delivered in Tsaritsin in time for spring planting, while the Soviet Government of Moscow has promised a further 1,800 tons of seed grain to the state of Tsaritsin.

These instances are merely cited as concrete examples of the serious effort which is being made by the Soviet Government of Russia to deal with the famine situation.

4. According to Commissar Kamenev the Soviet Government of Russia has purchased in Sweden and the Baltic states some 162,000 tons of grain to be used for seed purposes throughout Russia, and is endeavoring to purchase a further supply of seed grain in Persia. The plan of the Government, Commissar Kamenev states, is “to take from the hungry to feed the starving,” that is, for the central Government to requisition throughout Russia even the winter food supply of grain where there is such and distribute the same for fall sowing, as seed, in the famine area, in the hope of being able in the interim to replace the grain thus requisitioned. The desperate character of such a measure does not, of course, require to be pointed out. It may be seriously doubted if in any country in the world today such a measure could be carried out except in Russia, and it may be doubted, indeed, if it can be generally carried out in Russia. As a similar measure was carried out in Russia in 1919 for war purposes, it is possible that it may be carried out again this year, however.

5. A very extensive program of propaganda to persuade the peasants to remain on their farms and put in next season’s crops is being conducted by the Soviet Government by means of groups of men sent about the country to explain the need to the peasants, by means of posters, and through the Red Army whose functions combine those of soldiers with police.

6. Where, however, the peasant farmers have been unwilling to await the results of the Government’s efforts, and have left their homes in a panic of fear of a famine winter to crowd into the Volgaside cities, railway centers, and neighboring states, the Soviet Government has organized their transportation to such parts of Russia and Siberia as have enjoyed at
least an average crop and are in a position, therefore, to share their food supply with those who have none.

It is not pretended, even by the Soviet Government, that any of the above measures are anything more than mere emergency measures calculated to deal with the immediate problem as it arises. The Soviet Government has a well-conceived plan of rehabilitation of the present famine district, with a view to restoring it to at least its pre-war productiveness and if possible developing it even further. This will be considered later.

B. By Various Outside Relief Agencies

(a) The Society of Friends conducts and has conducted for a considerable period in Russia a sort of continuation of war relief work largely for children. Its work is well organized and ably administered, but it is comparatively very small. Through the intermediation of the Near East Relief in Transcaucasia, permission has recently been secured of the Soviet Government for additional workers of the Society of Friends to enter Russia and to increase the work, especially in the famine area.

(b) There are also a German Relief Committee and numerous smaller relief committees such as that for railway workers established by the railway workers unions of Sweden and similar organizations in the United States and elsewhere. The work of these committees is even smaller and more limited than that of the Society of Friends, and frequently they work through the Society of Friends.

(c) The American Relief Administration:

As has been said, when this Commission left Tiflis to undertake its investigation, on August 16, an accord had only just been reached between Commissar Litvinov and Mr. W. L. Brown, representing Mr. Hoover, for relief work in Russia by the American Relief Administration, which accord was not formally signed until August 20. This Commission was unaware of these negotiations at the time, and only learned the terms of the arrangement on its arrival in Moscow on August 22. The terms of the operation of the American Relief Administration in Russia as communicated to this Commission at that time by Commissar Kamenev were:

1. Relief to be confined to children and to the sick, and to be conducted along the lines hitherto followed by the American Relief Administration in other countries;
2. Complete control of distribution and property right in all supplies to remain with the American Relief Administration and the supplies of the American Relief Administration to be imported or exported free of any charges, and to be free from requisition;

3. The personnel of the American Relief Administration to be subject to no customs or sanitary examination by the Soviet authorities, and to be free to circulate wherever they wish throughout Russia;

4. The Soviet Government to furnish all requisite transportation, prepare kitchens, make any required improvements in sanitary conditions, and furnish all necessary medical aid;

5. And food supplies delivered to others than children or the sick to be paid for by the Soviet Government.

On August 27, a week after the signing of this agreement, Major Carroll and the first party of American Relief Administration workers arrived in Moscow from Riga, by special train, accompanied by a newspaper correspondent and a moving picture operator. This Commission waited upon them the following morning and communicated to them the result of its observations of the situation in Russia, so far. When this Commission left for the Volga district that night, Major Carroll and his coworkers remained in Moscow. From Samara, on August 30, this Commission telegraphed Major Carroll briefly the results of its observations in the Volga region, and urged haste.

As this Commission proceeded down the Volga without delay, it did not again encounter Major Carroll and his party; and as it completed its labors and left Russia before the arrival of Captain Saunders, representing Colonel Haskell, at Novorossiisk, it came into no contact with him. It is not, therefore, in position to comment on the work of the American Relief Administration in Russia.

C. By the International Red Cross

In its conference with Commissar Kamenev, on August 23, this Commission was informed by Commissar Kamenev that great hopes were entertained in Russia of the negotiations then pending between Dr. F. Nansen, representing the International Red Cross, and the Soviet Government. Commissar Kamenev and the other Soviet officials with whom this Commission spoke of the matter regarded the various relief agencies then operat-
ing or planning to operate in Russia as emergency relief only, but looked upon the International Red Cross as offering an opportunity of aiding in the work of rehabilitation in Russia on a permanent basis, by assisting the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic to establish foreign credits by virtue of which the agricultural machinery, railway supplies, fuel, building material, power machinery, etc., of which Russia stands in such great need, could be obtained abroad, to enable the country to effect that economic regeneration which, by mutual assistance between nations, has been effected elsewhere in the world since the war. This was the declared hope of every important Russian official with whom this Commission talked. They did not expect, however, that such credits would be extended to Russia as a matter of charity.

"Of course that is business, not charity," Commissar Kamenev told this Commission. "We are immensely grateful for America's generous offer of help for our starving children. But for the regeneration of Russia, we expect and are ready to pay our own way. Our handicap heretofore has been that we could not buy."

This Commission conferred with Dr. Nansen, in London, and found him determined to continue with his effort to secure credits from various nations for the regeneration of Russia, despite the unwillingness of the League of Nations to lend its moral support. As Dr. Nansen's plan is rather a measure of permanent rehabilitation than of temporary relief it is in general accord with what follows respecting the need for measures of economic regeneration in Russia.

It is the judgment of this Commission that however necessary certain emergency relief measures may be in meeting the crisis of the famine in the Volga district of Russia, and in preventing a harvest of wholesale death from starvation before another crop can be gathered, no measures of relief in Russia can accomplish any lasting good or insure Russia against an immediate return of famine conditions which do not have as their basis the purpose to enable the people of Russia to help themselves, by putting them in a position to achieve the economic rehabilitation of their country. The Commission has confined its observations to food production and to matters related to food supply. It has not been concerned with industry, commerce, or finance, and that fact must be borne in mind in considering the findings of this Commission as to the means of ending the present food
shortage in Russia and of preventing a repetition of famine conditions. It may be, for example, that the stimulation of the manufacture of agricultural implements in Russia would prove a sounder economic policy than their purchase abroad. With this, however, this Commission is not concerned; and its findings are confined to recording existing needs of which it has had abundant and convincing evidence.

To accomplish any lasting good not only for the people of Russia, whether in the famine district or elsewhere, but also for the rest of Europe, the following essentials are immediately requisite in Russia. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that every day's delay is supplying these essentials to Russia is not merely a postponement of rehabilitation but is the continuation in geometric progression of a process of economic and social disintegration which it cannot but be increasingly difficult to remedy. The grain producing country of Russia today is like a binder that is left standing in the open: for a short period it can easily be put into shape again; but after a time its deterioration is so rapid that it soon becomes worthless. It should be evident to anyone that when the grain producing country of Russia reaches the stage where the peasant farmers close their homes, pack their belongings, and leave the country, action if any is ever to be taken is necessary without delay.

These essentials are:

1. Food sufficient to enable the peasant farmers to live on their farms until next harvest is in, and to induce those who have left to return to their farms.
2. Seed sufficient to sow at the very least the minimum acreage of 1920, and if possible of course more.
3. Agricultural implements sufficient to cultivate the land, sow this seed, and harvest the resulting crop in 1922.
4. Either draft animals to take the place of those which have been taken from the farms during the last seven years for use in the army, or have been eaten up in the last few months by the hungry peasants, or in default thereof, tractors in sufficient numbers to do the work required.
5. Sufficient transportation to insure the rapid distribution of these things at the points where they are needed by the peasant farmers.

These items will be considered separately.

1. **Food.** The feeding of a million children will probably save a vast number of children from death. But it will not enable
the working farmer to keep through the coming winter sufficiently healthy to put in as large a crop as possible next spring, nor will it keep his draft animals from dying, nor will it induce those families which have left the country to return to their farms.

In considering the matter of food, apart from seed, the former is the important item, for without farmers to cultivate the land, another famine next year is inevitable, and such a result must be clearly foreseen as the outcome of insufficient provision of food to keep the peasants on their farms. To meet this situation, this Commission has in the foregoing estimated the food needs at 945,000 tons of grain. To this should also be added 50,000 tons, the minimum food requirements for Transcaucasian Russia (Armenia), making a total of 995,000 tons of grain for food purposes.

2. Seed. Under the heading The Seed Problem in this report the matter of the seed requirements of the Volga region of Russia has been dealt with in detail. To plant slightly less than the pre-war acreage would require 1,850,000 tons of grain for seed. The desire of People's Commissar for Agriculture, V. V. Ossinsky, to sow more than the normal acreage for which he would like to secure 3,960,000 tons of seed grain is no doubt laudable; but in view of the shortage of agricultural implements and draft animals it would be wiser not to attempt the entire regeneration of Russia in one season. If mere self-support is the aim, however, and not simply sufficient aid to continue a state of hunger indefinitely, at least the 1920 acreage of 18,886,000 acres should be planted and at least 1,000,000 tons of seed grain provided for that purpose. Of this amount Russia hopes to be able to furnish 162,000 tons, leaving 838,000 tons as a seed requirement. To this may be added the 6,250 tons of the minimum seed requirement of Armenia, making a total seed requirement of 844,250 tons, or in round figures, 850,000 tons for seed and 995,000 tons for food, a total grain requirement of 1,895,000 tons. This amount alone would be necessary to insure the return of the entire Volga region to its former position of the grain reservoir of Europe.

3. Agricultural implements. The matter of the exhaustion of the existing supply of agricultural implements in Russia has already been considered. Since 1914, that is for seven years, it has been virtually impossible for anyone in Russia to secure any new agricultural implements.
Moreover, repairs to the existing agricultural equipment of Russia, where spare parts of agricultural machinery were concerned, were quite as difficult of securing as new machinery itself, while the blacksmiths who would normally make the minor repairs were among the first to be mobilized and the last to be released in an army in which cavalry plays so prominent a part. Of the more than 300,000,000 acres of arable land in European Russia, even before the war only about 266,000,000 acres had ever been under the plow at any time, while in the Volga district the average proportion of cultivation was only about 30 per cent, and the agricultural equipment, meager and primitive as it always was, bore about this relation to the agricultural task in hand. With seven years of deterioration it is a wonder that any of this equipment is left at all, and indeed little is. It is therefore vain to speculate on what could be done to save Russia from disaster by supplying the Volga people with seed grain, unless at the same time the necessary means of planting this grain are also made available.

4. Tractors. What applies to agricultural implements applies also, of course, even in greater degree to draft animals or power machinery. For while scythes and plows and harrows were not requisitioned by the army for war purposes during the past seven years, horses were.

According to statistics furnished by the People's Commissar for Agriculture there was a reduction in the number of draft horses between 1916 and 1920 of 16 per cent—that is, of course, not simply that 16 per cent of the draft horses had been withdrawn from the pursuits of peace, but that 16 per cent of the draft horses of Russia had disappeared, largely due of course to the losses of war. This Commission has no figures as to what proportion of the remaining 84 per cent of the draft horses of Russia are still on the farms. Relatively few are in the cities, for under the present Government private carriages, racing stables, hunting mounts, and horses for pleasure riding have disappeared. On the other hand, however, it has been the observation of this Commission that the shortage of farm horses is very serious indeed, and that, in point of fact, one of the principal causes of the gradual reduction of grain production year by year has been the increased shallow plowing, the inevitable result of a shortage of draft animals. The average depth of furrow today in the Volga district is five inches, which in default of very rich land and fertilizer is a certain forerunner of
lessened crops. There is and can be no reasonable cause of this save a shortage of draft animals. With the enormous sacrifice of draft animals now taking place in the famine area, both by their starvation and their use as food, perhaps one of the most serious results of the present famine in the Volga district of Russia may be the loss of the few remaining draft animals in that territory. For while one good year may serve to put an agricultural country on its feet in the matter of grain production, draft horses, unlike wheat, cannot be raised in one year.

Two things are clear in respect of the draft animals in the Volga district of Russia: (1) There were never at any time more than about one-third the number necessary to cultivate all the arable land; (2) there are today scarcely one-half this number and by next spring there will not be anything like so many available for the planting and harvesting of the 1922 crop.

Under these circumstances there is but one solution of the question: tractors. This is appreciated by everyone with whom this Commission spoke of the matter. There are today in Russia, the property of the Soviet Government and in use for demonstration purposes and to cultivate the national land, a number of tractors—mostly old-fashioned, out-of-date machines. There should be at least 2,000 and in order that the program of rehabilitation which is here being considered may be carried out successfully, there must be at least 1,500 tractors sent to the famine district of Russia with the seed wheat of which mention has been made above. The tractors in question can remain the property of the central Soviet Government, of the local state soviets, or of the communities themselves, as may seem expedient. The important thing is that the war consumption of draft animals must be replaced on the farm by something. We are not here considering small, intensive farming land holdings, where specialized high value crops are raised as in France or Belgium, where wine grapes or sugar beets or similar crops are cultivated; but land like that of the Dakotas or Minnesota, where cultivation must be on a large scale or not at all.

5. Transportation. This matter, in many ways crucial in respect of the famine situation in Russia, has not been previously considered. Yet it is obvious that unless the supplies considered in this program of rehabilitation for Russia can be got promptly to those who require them they will be useless.
The transportation problem in Russia today is vital. No other one phase of the economic life of the country has suffered from the war as has the transportation system. The problem of rail transportation in Russia today is a twofold one, and comprises two elements of difficulty (a) fuel and (b) locomotives. These may be considered separately.

FUEL. According to Prof. George Lomonossoff, Director General of Russian Railways under the Imperial Government and subsequently under the Kerensky Government and today, under the Soviet Government, occupying the important post of chief of the Russian Commission for the Purchase of Railway Supplies abroad, there are now in Russia 1,750 locomotives idle for lack of fuel. In view of the handicap under which Soviet Russia is laboring on account of the shortage of locomotives this enforced idleness of so large a portion of the locomotives that there are in Russia is, to use the expression of Professor Lomonossoff, “disheartening.” But the reasons for it are not, after all, far to seek.

There are three types of fuel used in the Russian railway system: “mazoot” (oil residue), coal, and wood. North of the Gomel-Kalooga-Moscow-Nijhny Novgorod-Kazan-Samara line, wood is burned. South of this line and west of the Moscow-Ryazin-Voronejh-Novocherkavsk line, coal is burned; while in the remaining southeastern section, including the whole of Transcaucasia to the Persian frontier and even beyond, the fuel used is mazoot.

This division, however, is elastic, so that when there is a shortage of one kind of fuel the other two fuels can, by an appropriate redistribution of their respective fields, absorb, for a time at least, the field in which the shortage occurs. Thus in case of a shortage of coal, for example, the southern part of the coal burning territory would normally be absorbed by the mazoot field while the northern part would, similarly, be taken care of by the wood burning field. But it is self evident that unless Russia possessed a triple complement of locomotives adapted to the use of each of these fuels (which is not, of course, the case) any such enforced readjustment would be certain to throw out of use a considerable number of locomotives adapted to the consumption of one kind of fuel and to put a corresponding strain on the locomotives adapted to the other two kinds of fuel. It goes without saying that alterations could be made in the locomotives at need; and this has, naturally, been done.
But the salient fact in the Russian situation today is that there is a shortage, not in one field alone, but in two: the oil and the coal fields. It is neither possible nor is it desirable to adapt all the locomotives of Russia to burn wood. There are bound to be, therefore, a certain very considerable number of locomotives which, under the circumstances, are useless for lack of fuel. The reasons for this fact are not far to seek.

1. The mazout (oil residue) shortage is of long standing, and is due to the fact that the oil wells of Baku, in the Socialist Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, which formerly produced 13 per cent of the oil output of the world, have produced little or nothing since 1917, owing to disturbed conditions in that country with which the Government of Russia had very little to do. In December, 1917, for example, when the Russian Transcaucasian army, following the November revolution in Russia, determined to return home, there was an uprising among the Turkish sympathizing Mohammedan Tartars of Azerbaijan against Russia which resulted in the most savage kind of fighting, in the course of which the oil wells of Baku were very seriously damaged and the pumping machinery, on which no repairs had been made since 1914, suffered considerably. In March of the following year, the Russian workmen of the oil fields and the Armenians of Azerbaijan joined to effect a soviet revolution against the rule of the Tartars; but on September 14, 1918, the Turks, who had been called to the aid of their coreligionists in Azerbaijan, took and partially sacked Baku, with a corresponding further damage to the oil wells. In November, 1918, after the defeat of Turkey and her allies in Europe, another upheaval in Azerbaijan invited the British to replace the Turks, while in May, 1920, a fifth revolution in Baku expelled the British and a local Soviet Government was formed, friendly to Russia, which seems to be fairly permanent.

All of these conflicts, to which were added from time to time occasional bombardments of the oil fields by Denikin's Caspian fleet, served to leave the oil wells of Baku in a state of ruin. What machinery had not been willfully destroyed had so deteriorated from neglect and from careless handling by those unfamiliar with its use that it was and is of no value. From May, 1920, to date the Soviet Government of Russia has profited of the reserve supply of oil stored in reservoirs in Baku, for fuel purposes; and what additional supply of oil has been required has come from the smaller field of Grosnaya, in the Au-
tonomous Gorsk Republic, north of the Caucasus Mountains. This latter field is not and never will be adequate to the needs of Russia. So far as oil fuel is concerned, there is but one solution, namely, new machinery and technical experts for the Baku field. Neither are at present available in Russia.

2. The coal shortage in Russia is of much more recent origin than the shortage of mazoot. It dates primarily from the operations of the Denikin army in and about the Donetz coal basin in 1919, seconded by the operations, never actually in, but against, the Donetz coal basin by the Wrangel armies in 1920. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the choice of Taganrog in the Donetz coal basin as Denikin’s headquarters, and of the Donetz coal basin itself as the immediate objective of the Wrangel armies, was not altogether fortuitous. The coal and iron mines of this region had been, formerly, French properties. The “basin,” lying north of the Sea of Azov and in the valley of the Donetz River, comprises some 10,000 square miles and produced, before the war, between 25,000,000 and 30,000,000 tons of coal annually. When Denikin’s effort at the reconquest of Russia finally failed, he left this district, which had been the center of his military operations, a ruin. This Commission has been through the district in question, and can compare it adequately only to the similar mining districts of northern France and Belgium immediately after the armistice. There is this difference, however; the terms of the peace treaty imposed on the vanquished in the war the duty of putting the mines of France and Belgium in a state of operation once more. Those of the Donetz coal basin are as they were left by the Denikin armies, and the economic blockade of Russia has made it impossible for the Russian Government to put them in working order.

So far as both mazoot and coal shortages are concerned it should be clear from the above that no action of the Soviet Government of Russia, alone, can solve the problem which these shortages make daily more vital to the entire transportation system of Russia. What is required, primarily, as in the case of the agricultural redemption of the country, is new machinery to replace that destroyed by war or deteriorated through seven years of Russia’s isolation from what were the sources of the supply of machinery in Russia, even before the war. The transportation question is a very grave one for Russia, and the fuel element in it is the more grave because it affects other industries as well as transportation.
LOCOMOTIVES. The Russian gauge is, as is generally known, 5 inches wider than the standard gauge. Throughout the entire war, therefore, any locomotives which may have been captured from other countries by the Russian armies have been useless. From 1914 on, Russia was condemned to continue the operation of her railway transportation system with what locomotives she had on hand at that time.

At the height of the war, the Russian military front was some 2,000 miles in extent, and it was necessary to supply an army of unprecedented dispersion virtually entirely by rail. The strain which this placed upon the Russian railway system was so great that in 1916 both Moscow and Petrograd were left for considerable periods without food owing to the congestion of the railways devoted primarily to supplying the armies. The need for additional locomotives was seen, and a mission was sent to the United States to order them. The revolution, however, intervened and those locomotives were never delivered to the Soviet Government of Russia. Recently 700 locomotives have been ordered in Germany, to be delivered by the end of February, 1922, together with a considerable quantity of spare parts, tires, boiler tubing, and other material for the repair of the locomotives now in Russia. One thousand locomotives have also been ordered in Sweden, of which 50 are to be delivered this year and 250 each succeeding year until complete delivery has been made. At present, however, there is an acute shortage of locomotives in Russia which greatly complicates the handling of the famine situation by the Russian Soviet Government. Every important railway junction visited by this Commission—Rostov-on-Don, Moscow, Ryazin, Rozavka, Rtistschevo, Tikhorietskaya—was cluttered with useless locomotives in every stage of disintegration, which were being used to furnish spare parts to locomotives in slightly better condition, being kept in service by dint of great economy and ingenuity.

This Commission would fail of its duty, however, did it not record that the limited train service which is attempted under these trying circumstances is surprisingly well conducted. Trains leave on time and generally speaking arrive on time. The great continental expresses which link Russia with Transcaucasia, Transcaspia, Turkestan, and Siberia, and those which connect Petrograd with Rostov-on-Don and Odessa run regularly. Yet the railway roadbeds throughout Russia are sadly

39
in need of repairs. In the district where Denikin's army operated scarcely a station or a water tank is left standing, and there is not a single bridge, even including the great railway bridge over the Don at Chir, which has not been damaged or blown up. Yet all of these bridges, left behind by the retreating Denikin armies in this condition, have been very skilfully repaired or replaced by wood construction in default of structural steel. The need for structural steel in Russia today, to make these repairs permanent, is stupendous. According to Professor Lomonossoff, if no impediment is placed in the way of Russia's purchase of railway supplies abroad, the railway system of Russia can be put in pre-war condition by January 1, 1927.

TRANSPORTATION IN RELATION TO THE FAMINE

Nevertheless, despite the handicaps of lack of fuel and locomotives and of damage to bridges and other equipment resulting from the civil war as well as of the normal wear and tear upon tracks and roadbeds, this Commission is convinced that whatever rail handling may be necessary to deliver the required grain supplies to the famine district to put that district on its feet once more, can and will be furnished by the railway workers of Russia with such equipment as they now have at hand. Of this the Commission has the personal assurance of President Yereshev and Secretary Starenko of the Railway Trainmen's Union of the Tsaritsin area, comprising 6,000 railway workers with a radius of 250 miles out of Tsaritsin.

It would undoubtedly, however, be of great advantage and would furnish an additional assurance of success if, in the event the quantity of grain essential to the rehabilitation of the famine district were to have to be moved, its shipment could be accompanied by some 30 of the locomotives of Russian gauge which were built in the United States in 1917, if these locomotives are still available. The Russian Soviet Government would be very willing to pay for the same.

In supplying the Volga district with the grain it requires the following routes could be employed, with Tsaritsin as the field base of distribution on the Volga, the river distribution to be effected by Volga steamers, of which there are a great number now available:

1. Out of Novorossiisk:
   (a) For loaded trains: Novorossiisk—Ekaterinodar—Tikhor-
ietskaya—Gnilaokassayskaya (altitude 525 feet)—Ssarepta—Tsaritsin. 504 miles. Grade gradual.

(b) For returning empties: Tsaritsin—Voljskaya—Likhaya—Rostov-on-Don — Tikhorietskaya — Novorossiisk. 623 miles. Heavy grade between Tsaritsin and Krivamoorghinskaya.

2. Out of Rostov-on-Don:
(a) All rail.
(1) For loaded trains: Rostov-on-Don—Botaisk—Tikhorietskaya—Gnilaokassayskaya (altitude 525 feet)—Ssarepta—Tsaritsin. 345 miles. Grade gradual.
(b) Partly by water.
By the Don: Transshipping direct to river barges in Rostov harbor, by barge to Kalech-Donskaya, by the Don river.
By rail: From Kalech-Donskaya—Voljskaya—Tsaritsin. 48 miles. Heavy grade, Krivamoorghinskaya.

By either of the two rail loops, out of Novorossiisk or Rostov-on-Don, 3 trains can be handled daily, 50 cars each, a total of 2,700 tons daily. In addition, and simultaneously, the Don can be used so long as it remains ice-free, in conjunction with the short haul from Kalech-Donskaya to Tsaritsin. By this route 5 additional trains can be handled daily, carrying 4,500 tons, making a daily total so long as the Don is open of 7,200 tons, and daily thereafter, by the all-rail route chosen, 2,700 tons. The Don freezes about December 15.

These various routes are shown on the map on page 42.

From Tsaritsin, the distribution should be by the Volga to the following subcenters of distribution: South of Tsaritsin: Cherny Yar; north of Tsaritsin: Kamystschin; Saratov; Syzran; Samara; Simbirsk; Kazan. From these subcenters of distribution, the peasant communities themselves can fetch the supplies allotted to each even after the Volga is frozen, using sledges on the ice.

It is self-evident that by effecting the distribution locally, according to the need of those who remain on their farms, a powerful stimulus will be brought to bear to keep the peasant farmers on their land where they will be in position to put in the maximum possible crop next spring, and an inducement will be created to those who have already left to return to the land.
SUMMARY

In the opinion of this Commission 1,845,000 tons of grain sent into Russia now, through the Black Sea and using either Novorossiisk or Rostov-on-Don as a base and Tsaritsin as a field base, and employing the Don River as long as the climate will permit, will make the difference between existing famine conditions this year and a duplication of the same conditions next year, with all that this implies of loss in grain production and in human life, and a return of the Volga region to a state of full production within two years at most, with the saving of Armenia from starvation, into the bargain.

It is recognized, that even under the most favorable conditions it would require a minimum of six months to deliver the amount of grain in question at points along the Volga where it could be fetched by the peasant farmers themselves. This is not, however, a matter of vital concern. What is vital is that a plan of action shall be decided upon as quickly as possible and a beginning made to put that plan into effect. The peasants of the Volga will wait even in the face of death, the execution of such a plan once they have reason to believe that a definite, effective plan of relief is actually to be carried out.
One point, however, should be emphasized, namely: it should be evident even to the most casual thinker that if a supply of grain is to be sent into Russia for the relief and rehabilitation of the famine-stricken inhabitants of the Volga region, it should be delivered to the Volga region, and not elsewhere. It will only embarrass the Soviet Government and risk a miscarriage of the enterprise, to have the supplies intended for the Volga famine sufferers merely delivered at some port or relief offered to the starving of the Volga region administered in Moscow or Petrograd.

A second item of cardinal importance must be emphasized, namely: so far as the furnishing of seed grain to enable the Volga farmers to sow a proper crop next year is concerned, it is essential that both the agricultural implements and the traction power necessary to breaking and sowing the land shall also be furnished the peasants. This means that about 2,000 small, two-plow tractors with full equipment must be sent into Russia with the seed grain. This would cost about $1,700,000.

**ADDITIONAL SUPPLIES DESIRABLE**

The survey conducted by this Commission has revealed a vast need in Russia of a number of other articles of primary necessity which it may be well to mention here.

1. *Clothing.* Throughout Russia there is evidently the greatest need of clothing. It is not necessary that this clothing be of any elaborate kind, but it is necessary that it shall be fairly warm. Reclaimed army uniforms and shoes; army blankets; the plainest and most durable of overalls; sweaters; heavy underwear; women's stockings. These would suffice. If a shipment of this sort of material could reach Russia before winter, many lives would undoubtedly be saved.

2. *Medical supplies.* There is an almost total lack of medicines and hospital supplies of all kinds in Russia. The daily toll of death from lack of ordinary medicines and the needless suffering due to lack of anesthetics seems to this Commission a senseless inhumanity accomplishing no beneficial result, political or otherwise.

3. *Common tools.* It is not even necessary to supply the wooden handles of such tools as saws, hammers, hoes, picks, shovels, axes, etc. The Russians are very skillful at making wooden articles of this nature; what they require is the metal parts.
4. Building materials. In addition to the above, there are required throughout Russia such articles as nails, hinges; plumbing supplies of all kinds, pipe; ordinary household articles such as pots and pans; sheet tin; window glass; kerosene stoves, etc. Cities like Rostov-on-Don, Tsaritsin, Samara, Alexandropol in Armenia, and others that have suffered from war destruction must be virtually rebuilt.

5. Structural steel. Mention has already been made of the need for structural steel in rebuilding bridges and large buildings destroyed during the civil war. This need is virtually limitless.

6. Electric power machinery. One of the declared purposes of the Russian Government is to “electrify Russia.” It is a plan to be encouraged, and it now has the popular imagination enlisted in its favor. What it requires to be carried out is electrical machinery and technicians.

IV. COOPERATION OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT

So far as this Commission is concerned a disposition of the fullest and most cordial cooperation was shown it by the Soviet authorities throughout Russia, from the lowest to the highest. It was given the freest opportunity to observe and no limitations of any kind were put upon its movements and no bounds, either expressed or implied, were put upon any report which this Commission might see fit to make.

This Commission found the Soviet officials uniformly earnest, hard-working, to all appearances sincere men, as well equipped for their work as the average officials of any country, and certainly, so far as the members of this Commission could judge, profiting in no way personally by whatever power their positions placed in their hands. The Commission did not discuss politics with the officials with whom it came into contact and is ignorant whether they were or were not Communists. It found them, however, reasonable men eager for the economic regeneration of their country and ready to take whatever steps they consistently could to achieve this end.

The Soviet Government of Russia is as well aware of the needs of the country as anyone can be. On April 6, 1921, for example, a decree of the Soviet Government formally recognized the crying need of agricultural implements and made provisions for an inventory of what implements are most urgently required. The People’s Commissariat for Education was instructed to
give preference to instruction of a technical nature in the manufacture, use, and repair of agricultural machinery and an agricultural instruction train was sent out to take practical instruction in the use of modern agricultural machinery to the farmers. Mention has been made of this train earlier in this Report. It is evident from this that the Soviet Government not only realizes what must be done in this particular field, but is ready and eager to do it. The same appears to be true of other fields.

From the beginning the Report of this Commission has envisaged a comprehensive scheme of economic aid of Russia, particularly in the agricultural field, on a very large scale. It has never, however, been the thought of this Commission that the program which it has clearly in mind, and which would, in its estimation, return the great wheat-growing region of Russia to its former position as the granary of Europe, should be a program of charity. On the contrary, Commissar Kamenev has been specifically quoted as saying that "for the regeneration of Russia we expect and are ready to pay our own way." This has been the attitude of the Soviet authorities with whom this Commission has come into contact throughout. That Soviet Russia is ready to pay in one form or another for the assistance which is required to accomplish in Russia that rehabilitation, in an economic sense, which elsewhere in Europe has been achieved at the expense of the defeated Central Empires, as a part of the peace terms, is in the estimation of this Commission a fact which needs no discussion. That much of the damage which must be repaired in Russia has been due to civil war, incited by those who have profited by the peace terms to accomplish their own rehabilitation, while Russia, which for three years at a frightful expense in human life fought beside the victors in the war, has suffered only territorial deprivations and a continued state of war, is unfortunately true. The knowledge of this fact is widespread in Russia, and is perhaps one of the difficulties in the way of a better understanding between Russia and the rest of the world. It is not a difficulty which obsesses the leaders of Russia, however—if indeed there be leaders in Russia. They are frankly ready to enter into commercial relations with other countries, and have demonstrated this willingness by consummating various commercial conventions with Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Greece, etc., which countries now have large so-called "commercial missions" in Moscow endowed with quasi-diplomatic functions.
This Commission is ignorant whether the Soviet Government of Russia still possesses a reserve of gold with which it can purchase the supplies, or any part thereof, of which mention has been made in this Report hitherto. But one thing is certain, namely, that Russia is a solvent country—that is, given the known natural resources of Russia, mineral, agricultural, arboreal, in mineral waters, in oil, etc., it is always possible for Russia to pledge this or that industry for a period of years for a sum sufficient to pay for any supplies which she may wish to obtain abroad. This is the system which has been followed in many countries—in Brazil, in Mexico, in Colombia, in most of the countries of Central America—with profit both to the country and to the concessionnaires. It is a system which Russia is today ready to adopt, and in fact has already adopted. This Commission is aware of a number of such concessions already granted.

It is beyond question that the Soviet Government is today ready to grant concessions of development under whatever guarantees may be required by prudence and good business. It can scarcely be contended, therefore, that Russia is either unable or unwilling to give sufficient security for whatever she may require not only to tide her over the present crisis, but to start the country on the upward path again. This Commission is convinced that the guarantees the Soviet Government of Russia is able to give as security of any such concessions are quite as sound as those of many established governments today.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In view of the expressed willingness and the ability of the Soviet Government of Russia to pay for what it requires, this Commission recommends:

1. That a commission be empowered without delay by the Congress of the United States, or if this should be deemed inadvisable, by the American Relief Administration, or any similar organization or group of organizations, American or international, of sufficient size to accomplish the work in hand, to obtain 1,845,000 tons of grain and to deliver the same to the farmers of the Volga region and those of Armenia, the delivery to be effected under the joint control of an American or an international commission and the Soviet Government of Russia.

It is the thought of this Commission that such an amount of grain should be regarded as a loan from the United States, or from those who supply it, to the people of the Volga region and
of Armenia to be repaid in kind on demand at a rate proportionate to the current market value of the grain in question, repayment to cover a fixed period of years and to begin in 1925.

2. That the United States Government facilitate under the Act of Congress authorizing the formation of associations for export trade the formation of an association of the American manufacturers of agricultural machinery and tractors, for the purpose of supplying to Russia $500,000,000 worth of agricultural machinery and tractors, as a commercial enterprise.

3. That a similar association be formed of the American manufacturers of locomotives and railway supplies, with which might be associated the manufacturers of bridge iron and steel, with a similar purpose in view, the amount of railway supplies, locomotives, and bridge iron and steel required for the rehabilitation of the Russian railway system to be fixed by a joint commission of technical experts.

4. That the United States enter into a trade agreement with Russia on the general lines of the trade agreements reached between the Soviet Government of Russia and the governments of Great Britain, Sweden, and Italy.

CONCLUSIONS

It is not the thought of this Commission that the above recommendations are to be regarded solely as a matter of business, though in the estimation of this Commission they are good business. There is a vast humanitarian element in the present situation in Russia. A sober, industrious, fundamentally honest and intelligent people, numerically greater than the population of the United States, has suffered cruelly from the war and the after-effects of the war. In the creation of the circumstances which have brought about their suffering the United States has not been altogether guiltless. It has been a party, with other nations, in maintaining an economic blockade of Russia which has made it difficult when not impossible for the Russian people to work out their own salvation—a great people, struggling blindly, perhaps, but very earnestly toward the light of a new day in human liberty.

There has been a wrong here which is not in harmony with the high ideals of the brotherhood of man which are at the foundation of our own institutions. The hour has come to repair this wrong by aiding in guiding toward civilization a vast population in grievous peril of going astray.
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