EUROPE
and The
NEXT WAR

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Europe and the Next War

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I. The Price of Peace

Europe is an old battle-ground; across its wheat-covered fields contending armies have swept again and again. But never, in five short years was more young blood spilt; never were more cities and towns desolated; never was more wealth poured out to win a war, than in the period that ended with the Treaty of Versailles. Between 1914 and 1919 Europe emptied herself of the best that she had. She offered her all for the winning of the war—to what purpose?

The stated object of the war, as formulated by the Allies, was to destroy German militarism and thus set men free from the slavery of compulsory military service; to stop the mad competition in the building of battle-ships; to remove the constant fear of attack and invasion; to bring permanent peace by cleansing the world of its war-makers. The war was fought by millions as a war to end war.

How fervently the people of Europe have wished for the end of war! And this time, by the millions, they believed that at last the dream of a world at peace would come true if only they could make the supreme effort and overthrow their enemies. For the realization of this wish: for the fulfilment of this dream, every home in the warring countries gave up its men and its wealth. To-day there is scarcely a family that has not its record of suffering and death during those five terrible years. The war itself took ten millions of lives and mutilated millions more. Famine and disease increased the normal death-toll of the contending nations by fifteen millions. Here were twenty-five millions of lives, paid down in five years as the price of peace. Beside that, there were the broken families; the shattered
hopes and ambitions; the ruined houses and villages and cities; the desolated country-side, and the three hundred billions of dollars of wealth which represents the direct and indirect costs of the war. Add to that the years of privation and misery that must elapse before the warring countries can return to a normal, pre-war life and the aggregate represents the price that the people of Europe paid for the peace which they coveted. Those who made these sacrifices; those who assumed this intolerable burden did it in the belief that they were buying, for their children, security from future war.

German militarism is destroyed. Kaiser and Junker have been driven from power. The Allies triumphed—how completely the terms of the Treaty bear witness. No modern war between great nations has been more thoroughly won; no enemy more severely humiliated; no more exacting conditions imposed. The Austrian and Turkish Empires are dismembered. Germany loses her navy and her merchant marine; her colonies; her foreign investments; her iron; her coal. She reduces her army. She pays a crushing indemnity. She accepts Allied surveillance for a generation. What more could the Allies have done? Dismember the German Empire also? But in that case Germany could have paid little or nothing. So Germany was left nearly intact, with the understanding that she would labor, during more than a generation, in order to make reparation and restitution for the losses of the war.

Kaiser and Junker have been driven from power. German militarism has been wiped out. Victory crowns the sacrifices and struggles of the Allied nations.

But has peace been gained? Are the Allied nations now busy beating their swords into plough-shares, and their swords into pruning hooks? Are they turning their attention to the pressing problems of reconstituting industry; scrapping military equipment; and reorganizing life on a truer and nobler basis—now that the threat of an armed Germany has been removed? Is Europe through with wars? Can the mothers who gave their sons and the children who were left fatherless by the war feel that, while the price was high, it was justified by the outcome?
There are millions of people in the United States who would like to know the answer to that question—I among the number. I am not sure that I have found the answer. There may be more than one answer that is correct; but that is the question that I have asked a thousand times of the people here in Europe during the past few months, and I desire, in this little book, to set down the answer as I heard it.

II. France and Russia

The peace of Europe is to-day in the hands of France and Russia. The Government of France represents the old world order—capitalism and imperialism. The Government of Russia represents the new world order—the control of industry by and for the workers. These two systems stand at daggers points—the one striving to destroy the new form of economic and social life; the other seeking to gain a foothold in the vast stretches of the North.

The Soviet Government did not exist in 1914. It never promised its people that a military victory would bring peace to a war-weary world. It was France—France and her Allies, that were to pacify the continent by sweeping the Boche from power. Therefore it is to France and her Allies that one must look, in the first instance for answer to the question—"Has the war brought peace to Europe?"

I want to ask that question in three parts, and to answer each of the parts separately. Thus—

1. Are the Allies at peace?
2. How do the masters of Allied Europe feel about the late war?
3. What attitude do they take toward the next war?

Those three questions, carefully answered, should make it possible to form some sort of conclusion with regard to the future peace of Allied Europe.

III. European Imperialism

Three great European empires entered the war on the side of the Allies—Britain, France and Russia. Later Italy joined forces with these three. But the Russian Revolution has put that country out of the running as a candidate for im-
perial honors. There remain only Great Britain, France and Italy. It is among them that the world must look for the signs of security and peace.

The war made Europe intensely imperialistic. With the exception of Russia and Austria, the old empires remain, in form if not in substance, and there have been added to their number other empires, or more correctly, other countries with imperial ambitions, like Poland and Czeco-Slovakia. These, and a half dozen of states, carved by the Allied statesmen out of the territory of their defeated rivals, are acting true to imperial form—grabbing everything in sight that strikes their fancies, and holding on with the tenacity of gamblers to the territory which they have secured. In the course of this contest, a score of wars have come and gone during the past two years, and there is every indication that the old predatory life of the Balkan Peninsula has been extended throughout central and northern Europe by this avalanche of petty states with their quarrels and ambitions. Therefore, in so far as political imperialism is an incentive to war, the peace of Europe is in greater danger at the present moment that it has been at any time during the past half century.

There is another side of this imperial problem that is even more threatening—the economic side. During the war, the great nations of Europe learned the lesson of team work. Some of the same experience came to the United States, and on both continents, the scale of capitalist enterprise was enormously increased. Profits were larger; surplus was greater; the system became more potent over the individual; in some cases, the state took control of whole blocks of the economic life and administered them, under the control of their owners, as a complete monopoly.

The lesson was not lost. The masters of capitalist society, once having learned the advantages that might be derived from working together, continued the practice after the war necessity had passed. In many cases, it was these groups of capitalists that were behind the formation of the new states, which they expected to control and exploit.

Nationalism, another asset of imperialists, has been greatly increased by the war.
There are more nations, since the war, in which pride of country is taught in the schools, preached in the churches and spread broadcast in the newspapers. The nationalism of the old European countries remains, and to their number has been added the multitude of new countries, without a history and without an established position—each with its nation-worship; each with its place-holders, its intrigue, its official corruption; each with its propaganda for national advantage; each with its flag and its army; each prepared to raise its hand, on the slightest provocation, against any or all of its numerous, jostling neighbors.

The former Austrian Empire and the border provinces of pre-war Russia have been given over politically to a horde of voracious, unscrupulous middle-class carpet-baggers, who have been promised place and power if they would play a very little, and in some cases, a very dirty game for some great nation, or for some great financial group.

Since the signing of the Treaty, the peace of Europe has rested to a very considerable degree, upon this morass of conflicting nationalities and petty imperialisms. These statements do not refer to the workers in the various countries. Outside of Russia, the workers are not in power. They refer to the members of a make-shift ruling class who have been put into positions of temporary and local advantage like those held by Kolchak, Wrangle and Paderewski. They refer to nations, created as stop-gaps or for the purpose of maintaining a "sanitary cordon" around Soviet Russia.

In the more important countries—in France, Italy and Great Britain—the same class is in power that made the war, and that has been endeavoring, since 1918, to restore peace. In every one of these countries, the workers are yearning and praying for peace, but as yet, the power to make it is not in their hands and will not be while the present system of society lasts. The workers may, in a given instance, prevent a war, as did the British workers in the summer of 1920 when they were threatened with an outbreak of hostilities against Russia, but such instances do not constitute the restoration of peace.

Peace cannot be established in Europe until there have been laid down the political and economic foundations upon which peace depends. Can the present rulers of Europe—
Lloyd-George, Pilsudsky, Giolitti, Millerand, Wrangle—establish those essential foundations? I answer—"No! In the light of the present political and economic struggle that is going on between the great nations of Europe, peace is unthinkable."

IV. French Diplomacy

The outstanding feature of the European political situation is the diplomacy of France.

Since the days of the Great Napoleon, the French ruling class has felt a propriety interest in Europe—an interest includes the entire continent. The more ambitious among the French statesmen saw their country sitting once more in the high place at the council table of the European nations, and deciding the destiny of Europe's millions. With Russia in the turmoil of Revolution and Germany temporarily out of the running, the time seemed to them ripe for a reassertion of the time-honored right of France to dictate the politics of the continent.

This political interest of the French in the destinies of continental Europe was very much influenced by the extent of her investments, which were particularly large in Russia. As one man put it, "There is not a person in France who has not something tucked away up along the Volga." He referred, of course, to the investing class, which is unusually large in France.

The diplomacy of France dominates Europe for two reasons:—First, because it is the only logical diplomacy for capitalist empires to pursue; second, because Great Britain, the only other capitalist power in Europe strong enough to have a diplomacy, as a matter of form lets some other nation direct the affairs of continental Europe, and then, as occasion offers, either forms an alliance with this nation, if it is not too powerful; or, if it grows dangerous, forms an alliance against it. By this means, the world power of the British is maintained, at the same time that their position in the affairs of Europe is assured at a relatively small cost. For some time, Great Britain has felt the necessity for clipping the wings of Germany. It was for that purpose that she shifted her alliances to two of her hereditary enemies—Russia and France. The war having de-
stroyed Germany's power and weakened that of France, the British feel no hesitancy in permitting the French to play at running Europe.

And the French are playing.

French diplomacy prevented the recognition of Kerensky in the early stages of the Russian Revolution. French diplomacy supported Denekine, Yudenich, Kolchak, and the other "white hopes" of the Allies. French diplomacy created the "sanitary cordon" of border states about the Bolshevist "menace," established the blockade and led to the invasion of Russia by the French, British and American soldiers. French diplomacy created and supported an "independent Poland"—as independent as a new born babe, lying helpless in the arms of a nurse. It was the staff of French officers that planned and directed the Polish campaign against Russia during the summer of 1920. It was the same diplomatic and military policy that prevented the Poles from making their peace with Russia a twelfth-month earlier. French diplomacy wrote the "hard peace" with Germany, Austria and Turkey, and would have written a harder one, had the Allies been willing. French diplomacy tolerated and fostered the monarchist ambitions in Hungary. French diplomacy forced the war in the Near East. It is the diplomacy of a proud, imperial, ambitious people. Behind it, however, there is no real power. It is an old man's body in a young man's finery.

But while the diplomacy of France has the support of the British Empire, it will remain the chief menace to the peace of Europe, and it will retain that support just so long as it is useful in holding down Britain's chief European trade rival—Germany; and in contending against the chief menace to Britain's capitalist existence—Russia. France, as the destroyer of German economic power and the antagonist of recognition for the Soviet Government, is pulling the hot chestnuts out of the fire and dropping them into a bag in the hands of John Bull.

French diplomacy is the puppet that is hopping up and down on the stage of European politics. The hand that is pulling the strings is British ambition.
V. British Ambition

Great Britain cleaned up on the Treaty. She received the virtual control of Africa and the Near East, including a stretch of territory from the Cape of Good Hope to the Malay Peninsula, together with the complete domination of the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, of the Red Sea and of the Persian Gulf. This insures to her, not only the much coveted trade routes to the East, but some of the richest territories of Asia as well; and it gives her a strategic hold on all of the peoples living about the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean.

Great Britain wanted nothing in Europe, and she got nothing. Consequently it has been easy for her to put upon the shoulders of France the task of enforcing the Treaty in the only part of the world where enforcement involves a serious responsibility, and to compel France, at Spa and elsewhere, to act as gendarme for the League of Nations.

In the same way, Great Britain is allowing France to play the leading role in the establishment of the “mandates” for the Near East. The interests of France there are incon siderable, but she has an army of seventy thousand engaged in her Syrian campaign at a time when her finances demand the utmost economy.

Meanwhile Britain continues her negotiations with Russia— alternating between a policy of wheedling and one of outraged dignity. On the same day, in the same copy of the British papers, one reads that Kameneff has been sent back to Russia after a savage lecture by the Prime Minister, and that Krassin has just closed important contracts with British firms for the supply of such and such materials to the Soviet Government.

The fact is that the British are seeking an alliance with Russia on terms that will keep the Russians out of Asia, and give the British capitalists large concessions in European Russia. Then, too, there is the other problem—the problem of the solvency of French diplomacy. Britain’s position as the mistress of the world forces her into an alliance with the dominant nation or the dominant group of nations in Europe. Which is that dominant nation? Is it France or Russia?
When it looked as though the Russians were about to take Warsaw, the chances of an alliance between Britain and the Soviets seemed excellent. The moment the tide turned in favor of the Poles, the negotiations with Russia were broken off.

The objective toward which Britain is moving is in plain sight, but the path that the British statesman must tread in order to reach that object, is a thorny one. At the first sign of serious French weakness; at the first demonstration of Russian strength, there will be a renewal of the tactics that the British statesmen followed during the crisis over the expected fall of Warsaw. Let the French power wane, and the British will join hands with Russia, furnish the Soviet Government with credit, and receive, in return, the concessions about which the British capitalists are so anxious and about which Lenine has already spoken on a number of occasions. Meanwhile, the whole matter hangs in the balance, and the peoples of Europe oscillate between war and peace.

Nor is the British Empire any too secure. The leading statesmen of Britain have spoken repeatedly of the danger that threatened—of a civil war in Ireland; of an uprising in India; of a religious war in the Near East. The whole fabric of capitalist civilization is in the balance, as Lord Milner reminded the House of Lords (July 20, 1920). There was a danger of the overthrow of law and order everywhere. "It was a danger by which we were now threatened all over the world as we had never been threatened before, and especially in India." Ten days later (July 31, 1920) the London Times, in an editorial, stated that "To-day the condition of Europe and of a large part of the world is scarcely less critical than it was six years ago. Within a few days, or at most a few weeks, we may know whether the Peace Treaty signed at Versailles will possess effective validity. * * * There is undoubtedly a widespread plot against Western civilization as we know it, and probably against British liberal institutions as a principal mainstay of that civilization."

With the vast structure of the British Empire at stake, British statesmen cannot be too particular about their relations with one of the European power. They will ally them-
selves where the alliance will count for most from the point of view of world control. And what is the choice before the statesmen of Britain? They must decide between Russia and France. Each day it is becoming more and more apparent that Russia holds the key to the future of Europe—not only because she has been the first to espouse a system of society that promises the European peoples relief from the intolerable burdens of the present order, but because she will soon hold the European balance of power unless the plans of her diplomats miscarry.

VI. The Russian Key

Each day that the diplomacy of France holds off the recognition of the Soviets, the Russians become potentially stronger. It is now three years since the Russian people threw off the rule of the Czar and began the task of setting up a government of their own, and during every minute of that time, they have been the victims of a concerted attack, organized, directed, financed and in many cases led by the accredited representatives of France, Japan, Great Britain and the United States. The simple Russian folk supposed that the great democratic nations of the West would send them help and friendship in their struggles to build up a new society. Acting on that belief, they asked, again and again, for recognition and assistance. They called for bread: they received a stone—full in the face.

The treatment has been continued for three years, and the suffering which it has entailed—the starvation; the disease; the warfare—has rendered the Russians bitter. They suffer the bitterness of utter isolation; the bitterness of good offices—spurned with contempt.

There is a revolutionary fervor in Russia. The leaders of the Communists feel that they are the representatives of a system of life that will free men from many of the burdens and miseries of the past. Despite the terrific cost of their experiment in anguish and suffering, many of the Russian people are equally convinced of its efficacy. At any rate, they prefer it to the systems of semi-slavery offered by Yudenich and Kolchak.

If the Allies were able to offer the masses of Russia something better than they now have, there might be some
hope of the success of the French diplomacy, but the reception given to the Allied troops who sought to bring "succor" to the Russian people through Archangel and Vladivostok should have convinced even the hardest of heart that the solution of the problem did not lie in that direction.

The Russian people are with the new Government—how completely, time will show, but certainly completely enough to have enabled that Government to withstand civil war, disease, starvation, and the combined military attacks of the most powerful nations of the world.

The leaders of the Soviet Government—called from obscurity into positions of immense authority—have displayed a statesmanship of an exceptionally high order. Lenine is recognized, by all who have dealt with him, as a man of unusual parts, and he is surrounded by men of equal ability.

Russia has an army—the only large army now existing in Europe. The Russian Revolution began with the demand for bread and peace, but when the military power of Europe was directed against her, Russia turned her attention to the problem of military organization. There is some difference of opinion as to the size of the Red Army, but it seems agreed that it consists of at least three millions, well organized, badly equipped, and inspired with the idea that they are fighting for a cause. This Red Army has had three years of constant fighting, under all conditions, and in the most discouraging of circumstances. Both the men and the leaders are now well trained for war.

There are two logical lines for the Russians to follow in the development of their diplomacy: one is an alliance with Germany—the resources of Russia and the markets of Russia linked with the German machinery; the other is a federation of the peoples of the East—an offensive and defensive alliance against their oppressors and exploiters from the West. Negotiations for the alliance with Germany have been going on for some time. The Congress of Eastern Peoples, held at Baku during September, 1920, and attended by nearly two thousand delegates from eastern Europe and western Asia, furnishes the basis for an eastern alliance.

If Russia makes the German Alliance, she dominates Europe and destroys the power of France. If she can
establish an effective organization among the peoples of the East, she has destroyed the British Empire.

France and Great Britain therefore have good reason to make common cause against the Soviet Government. But can France and Britain stay together? Will the Franco-British Alliance hold?

**VII. The Franco-British Alliance.**

France and Great Britain have fought against one another for centuries. Indeed, after Sedan, it was necessary to write some of the French school histories in order to prove that Germany and not England was the "hereditary enemy." The desirability of making common cause against the growing power of Germany has held the two peoples together for some time, but now that the "German menace" has been destroyed, the question of future policy must be decided.

With the Treaty, there was drafted a series of agreements providing for a triple alliance between France, Great Britain and the United States. The failure of the United States to sign these treaties practically destroyed their usefulness. There remains the Franco-British alliance.

The Franco-British relations have been seriously strained on a number of recent occasions. For example, there was the discussion over the division of the oil deposits in the Near East, and more recently, the discussion over the conduct of the Syrian War.

At the moment when the aggressiveness of the French in Syria threatened to precipitate a religious war, with the Mohammedans ranged on one side (including the peoples of India, Persia, the Near East and Egypt), and the British and French on the other, there was a debate in the British House of Commons in the course of which some pretty rude things were said about the French conduct of the whole affair. Lord Robert Cecil asserted that the conduct of the French was in complete contradiction with the Treaty; another member (Ormsby-Gore) declared that it was necessary that both the French Government and the Arab Government should understand exactly what were the demands of the British Government.

*Le Temps* of Paris, in a leading editorial (July 21, 1920) protested against "this intolerable habit of putting the
French Government on the same footing as the 'Arab Government,' and of citing both before the bar of the British Parliament,” with many more words to the same general effect, ending with the cynical comment that the French were doing, in Syria, exactly what the British were doing in Mesopotamia, with this difference,—“to-day, France is seeking to establish, in Syria, a regime of direct administration—the regime which England already practices in Mesopotamia.” However, adds the wise editor of *Le Temps*, the Franco-British friendship “is too necessary for the peace of Europe to depend on intrigues in the Levant.” And he concludes, “The alliance is firm.”

But the alliance is not firm, as anyone may ascertain by going among the French and British people, and asking their opinion of the nation across the channel. The old hostility remains, everywhere; even during the war the French and British soldiers and sailors had the greatest difficulty in preventing open ruptures. The British and French are utterly unlike in their methods of working and living. They do not understand one another any better to-day than they did in the days when the Duke of Wellington defeated the first Napoleon. The old animosities lie deep in the traditions of the people, ready to break from cover on the slightest provocation.

The Franco-British alliance is a marriage of convenience. It is not based on racial affinity, nor on correlative economic needs. It is one of those alliances that exist through the force of a set of circumstances that compel contending parties to join hands, in spite of themselves, to meet a crisis. When the crisis passes, the alliance dissolves.

France and Britain united to crush their common enemy, Germany. Having accomplished that task, they maintained their alliance to combat the threat of Russian Socialism. But now a new danger threatens Britain—the menace of an eastern alliance that may result in the destruction of the British Empire. The time has therefore come when the demands of world politics may compel the British to ally themselves with Russia, in order to mitigate the Russian influence in this Alliance of the East. Add to that fact the dangers to British domination in Europe, of an alliance formed by Russia and Germany against Great Britain and
France, and it seems likely that, at no very distant time, the
day may dawn when France will be compelled to carry the
burden of her present imperialistic policies alone. Has she
the means to do this unaided? No one supposes so for
a moment—least of all her own statesmen.

With the failure of the French diplomacy will go the
entire structure created by the Treaty of Versailles—the
independent Poland; the sanitary cordon about Russia; the
dismemberment of the Austrian Empire; the surveillance
over the economic and military life of Germany. France
is to-day among the great nations of Europe, the only
sturdy champion of the Treaty; and unless all signs fail,
hers days, in that role, are numbered.

The details of this picture will shift, but the general
features will remain—the swarm of contentious, up-start
nations; the blind tyranny of French diplomacy; the grow-
ing power of Russia as a political factor in the life of post-
war Europe; the instability of British European diplomacy
in the face of an unstable Europe; and the rupture of the
Franco-British alliance, owing to the pressing world de-
mands of British imperial policy. Central Europe, torn by
internal dissension, embittered beyond the descriptive power
of words, loaded down with unbearable indemnities, debts
and taxes, and hedged in by the economic and political
restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Verseilles, will con-
tinue to search for some occasion that will make it possible
to realign the political forces of Europe, and if necessary
to resume a military struggle that offers at least some hope
of improvement in their present plight.

The political antagonisms and conflicts of Europe were
neither simplified nor ameliorated by the Treaty. Instead,
they were made more complex by the setting up of new na-
tions, some of which have no basis in economic unity, racial
affinity or political understanding. These new nations, in-
jected into the maelstrom of European political conflict in-
cident to the war, found themselves in a position where they
must intrigue and barter with one another and with the
larger nations, for the bare right to survive.

The political equilibrium of Europe was unstable in 1913.
It is even less stable in 1920. Under no conceivable circum-
stances can this political instability form an adequate basis for peace.

VIII. The Struggle for Economic Power

The facts that have been cited thus far in answer to the question: "Are the Allies at peace?" deal with political disaccords. They are serious enough to guarantee, at no very distant date, disturbances of the most far-reaching character, yet they are merely surface indications of some of the more basic contentions that are now in progress—I refer to the contentions between important groups of bankers.

It is easy to follow the political moves, they are in all of the papers. But the economic moves must be guessed at. Yet they are the ones that will, more than any other, determine the future of European capitalism—its success or failure: its peace or its war.

The disasters of the years 1914 to 1919 converted Europe—particularly Central Europe—into a vast bargain counter. Governments dissolved; stable economic relations disappeared; exchange rates swept back and forth over an immense margin. Perhaps the latter are the best published indication of the opportunities that were opened to certain banking and business groups in France, Great Britain and the United States.

During the war the business men and financiers—particularly those of France, Great Britain and the United States—made huge profits and laid aside immense surpluses. The same thing was true of the financial and business leaders of the neutral countries. France, whose industrial areas were so seriously over-run by the invading armies, gained less advantage in this respect than Great Britain and the United States, neither of which suffered the actual devastation of war.

The overturn in Russia, the breakdown of the established order in Central Europe, the creation of a number of small, weak, semi-independent states under the Treaty, threw open to the bankers of the Allied world an opportunity to secure some of the choicest spots and some of the richest resources of Europe. There were the lands of the Ukraine, the tobacco fields of Thrace, the oil properties of Eastern Europe and western Asia, the timber lands of Russia and Siberia.
Before this bargain-display, the capitalists of the Allied and neutral countries ranged themselves. Because of the relative advantage given by the exchange rate, it was the American and British buyers that had the best chance, and if report speaks true, they have availed themselves of their opportunities. This is particularly true of the British, who were more ready to go into the market than the Americans. Just as the German business developments abroad were distributed among the Allies under the Treaty, so, over the counter of international finance, the favored few bought, for a song, some of the most coveted portions of Europe.

There is another side of the problem.

Thus far, I have spoken only of investment opportunities. But before the question of investment comes the question of securing enough of the necessary resources to maintain industry.

Europe is not over supplied with certain economic resources—iron, coal, copper, oil—products which are needed by all of the capitalist countries. The war stimulated and accentuated this need. Since the life or death of a country may be bound up in its supply of resources, and since there are not enough of these resources to go around among the capitalist nations of Europe, there results a struggle upon which the whole future of the nations depends.

This struggle is typified in the present contests to secure the coal deposits of central and western Europe.

The war increased the demand for coal by increasing the use of machinery. It decreased the coal supply through the destruction of mines in the devastated regions and the reduction of man-power efficiency. Consequently, during the winters beginning with 1915-1916, the people of Europe suffered intensely from lack of coal, and if one may believe the reports, the situation this winter will be as bad or worse than it has been at any time. Furthermore, during this entire period transport and manufacturing have been seriously handicapped because of the coal shortage.

If you will look at a resource map of Europe, with the coal deposits marked in black, you will understand at once where there has been so much talk about Alsace, the Ruhr, the Saar, and Silesia. They contain the bulk of the coal upon which central and western Europe must depend. From
every point of view, they were the prizes of the war as
they are mainstays of economic power during peace.

France sought, through her victory, to gain three out of
four of these prizes. She received Alsace and Lorraine
outright; she received the Saar for fifteen years under cir-
cumstances that will enable her to keep it if she desires to;
she received a sort of first mortgage on the coal of the Ruhr.
Why did the French go to all of this trouble. A glance at
the figures for coal production in 1913 gives the answer.

The annual production of coal, in metric tons, for 1913,
is as follows,—the United States, 464 millions of tons; Great
Britain, 260 millions; Germany, 177 millions; France, 40
millions.

No country that seeks industrial or commercial supremacy
can hope to win on a paltry forty millions of tons of coal,
in comparison with the hundreds of millions of her rivals.
Before the war France eked out this meager supply by im-
porting 11 million tons a year from Great Britain; 6 million
tons from Germany, and 5 millions from Belgium.

The war stopped the importation from Germany and
greatly decreased the productivity of the French mines.
Consequently, France was strangling economically for lack
of coal. Some idea of the seriousness of her predicament
may be gained from this cry of anguish, uttered by the lead-
ing figure in the French iron and steel industry—Eugene
Schneider—in his address to the International Chamber of
Commerce (from Le Temps, June 30, 1920). “We are short
of combustibles! We lack coal! The coal shortage inter-
feres seriously with all of our industries, but, particularly,
perhaps, with metallurgie. * * * At this moment the German
steel industries are working at 65 per cent. of their total
capacity, while the French steel industries, through lack of
coal, can work only 25 per cent. * * * Gentlemen, it seems
to me that you can no more refuse us coal than you can
refuse a drink to a wounded man!”

This terrible shortage of coal is reflected in the prices
that the French are paying for the little coal that they re-
ceive. In Paris, the supply of English briquettes which
may be had at from 400 to 500 francs per ton is strictly
limited. In the south of France, near the La Mûre coal
fields, the consumer is paying 350 francs per ton for a very
inferior grade of La Mûre anthracite, and is limited to 70 pounds of coal per person per month. The winter is dreaded everywhere in France because even those who have the money to buy coal at these exorbitant prices, cannot get more than a dribble of fuel.

The French attempted, through the Treaty, to save the situation by providing that Germany should deliver two millions of tons a month for the first five years, and lesser sums thereafter. In April of 1920, the Germans delivered 800,000 tons; in May, one million tons, and in June, 400,000 tons. Up to that time, deliveries had been 51.3 per cent. of promises.

Then came the conference at Spa—with its eight days devoted to coal. The upshot of the conference was that the French agreed to advance 200,000,000 of francs per month for "supplies" and the Germans agreed to deliver, monthly, 1,500,000 tons of coal. As far as any one may gather from the reports, the Germans insisted that if the French wanted the coal, they must supply the money to feed the miners. The alternative was the occupation of the Ruhr, which would have required from 500,000 to 600,000 troops, most or all of them French. This would have meant calling out three "classes" of the French conscripts—an almost impossible thing in the present state of public opinion. The French therefore took what they could get, and agreed to pay for the coal at the rate of 200 francs per ton, delivered at the border!

When Millerand returned to the Chamber of Deputies, after the Spa conference, to make his report, the following debate took place:

Millerand explained the failure of the Germans to deliver coal under the old arrangement, and then said—

Millerand:—Under the new engagement—
M. Inghels:—It will be kept like the last one!
Millerand:—. . . we are allowed per month, including the coal transformed into coke, 1,500,000 tons.
From the right:—Of promises!

Millerand:—I ask your pardon for these figures. (Go ahead! Go on!) . . . Now, speaking of France, with its old frontiers—Alsace and Lorraine and the Saar included in the whole—this will be, for the next winter, the situa-
tion from the point of view of the provision of coal: German coal, 1,500,000 tons; French mined coal, 1,600,000 tons; English coal, 750,000 tons; American coal, 250,000 tons; Belgian coal, 100,000 tons; making a total, by the month, of 4,200,000 tons.

From the extreme left:—On paper.

Millerand:—Since the monthly needs amount to 5,300,000 tons, in the aggregate, you can see that these needs will be satisfied in the proportion of 80 per cent.

That is the present situation. The French people, with coal requirements of more than five millions of tons per month, are producing less than a third of this supply. For another third, they are dependent upon their most implacable enemies. The remainder of the supply, subject to strikes, transportation tie-ups, and other things wholly beyond the control of the French Government or the French people, is to come from three countries—one of them separated from France by more than three thousand miles of water. Even with all of these provisions, they will receive, at the maximum, only four-fifths of their coal needs.

At the same time, the very provisions that supply France with a portion of the coal that she requires in order to enable her industries to survive and her people to live, take from the industries and the people of Central Europe the same indispensable supplies. The arrangement that gives fuel to one country—leaves the other to face the winter with empty hearths.

The intensity of the situation may better be imagined than described, yet, barring the details, the same kind of a struggle is being waged for the iron ores of the continent; for the oil fields of the East, and for the other resources without which nations cannot maintain the modern economic system.

This is all a part of the "war after the war"—the economic struggle that was predicted and anticipated by the leaders among the financiers and business men of the Allied countries. The arms are laid down; the battle fields are cleared of their soldiers; the treaties are signed, and the masters of economic life in Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States hasten back to their offices and their factories—prepared to exact the uttermost farthing; to drive
the sharpest bargain; to take the final advantage; to play the old business game in all of its ferocious aspects; to go out, every man for himself and to let the devil take the hindermost.

Had the war resulted in the formation of an international league of the European capitalists; had they decided, after the manner of some of the great industrial combines of the United States, to pool their interests, rob the public and divide the loot, there might be some ground for hope that the capitalist nations of Europe could continue, at least for a time, without a fresh outbreak of hostilities. Nothing of the kind has occurred, however. Instead, the industrial and financial masters of each country have retired within their own borders, thrown up new intrenchments and prepared to continue the ancient economic warfare on a grander scale than ever before.

I have said nothing of the plight of the Central Empires. Stripped of their resources, their commerce and their financial connections; saddled with a huge indemnity, and under the constant surveillance of the Allied power, it must be obvious to everyone that their only salvation lies in some outbreak that will again upset the equilibrium of capitalist Europe and give them an opportunity to grab back some of the tid-bits that were grabbed from them during the negotiations at Versailles. There is no more hope of peace from them than there is hope of sunshine from a storm-cloud. That is why I have confined myself to the Allies. Among them, and from them, must come the forces, if there be any, that will restore a distracted continent to comparative stability and peace. Neither in Allies' politics nor in Allies' economic activity is there the slightest indication that an equilibrium has been reached. On the contrary, all of the available evidence points to the resumption of the same struggle for political preferment and for economic advantage that was responsible for pushing Europe into the abyss of 1914-1919.

To return then, to the first question,—“What is the present relation between the Allies?” the answer is that they are continuing the pre-war economic struggle, under circumstances far more trying than those of 1913, and with renewed intensity.
IX. Remember!

That leads to the second question,—"How do the masters of Allied Europe feel about the late war?"

There is no need to ask that question about the vanquished. Their sentiments can readily be imagined. But the victors—those who triumphed on the battle fields and recorded their triumphs in the Versailles treaty—what is their point of view now that it is all over?

Take Italy first. There may be found a spark of what was once called "chivalry."

When the war was over; when the beaten enemy had retired within his own borders, disgraced, outcast,—it was the Italian cities that first responded to the cry of the Austrian children for bread; and when the Austrian mission under Renner made visits to the Italian Government, it was received with the ancient courtesy that a gentleman was supposed to extend to a defeated rival. There was no bitterness and animosity. The Italians seemed sorry—that was all.

There is no other country in Europe where a similar attitude may be encountered, and unfortunately for the young men and women of the Allied and Central powers, the position of Italy makes her a relatively small factor in the councils of the European nations.

The attitude of France is far more typical. During the war France lost 1,400,000 who died on the field of battle or in the hospitals. The increase of deaths over the normal rate accounted for 1,840,000 more, making a total of over three millions in a population of less than forty millions—eight per cent. For certain ages more than half of the men were killed or died in the service. The United States, to suffer a proportional loss must have counted her dead at ten millions.

This loss extends throughout France. There is not a village, not a hamlet, not a home that has escaped. It is no uncommon thing to talk with men and women who lost ten, a dozen, twenty relatives during the war. I remember one middle aged man—the guide in a large factory. He had three children when the war broke out—a daughter and two sons. Both of the boys went with the first detachments.
and both were killed during the first few months of the fighting. "You see," he said, "I have only one child left now—the girl!"

Everywhere there is this feeling of emptiness, and in the North it is augmented by the wasted fields; the ruined villages; the pathetic, topless, limbless trees, and the rusted remains of war that dot the landscape.

The men are gone. Women follow the plough; reap and labor. Little children enter the stores and factories to eke out the meager pension (for the widows of soldiers, 850 francs or $170 per year; for children, 300 francs or $60 per year). The struggle for life, among those who are left, has become terribly bitter.

This bitterness communicates itself to the thinking of the people. Everyone believes that the Germans who lost have suffered less than the French, who won. At least the war was never fought on the ploughed fields, and through the cities and towns of Germany. The price of the victory has been so high that the French feel toward their defeated enemies very much as the people of the South felt toward the North after the Civil War. On paper, it was a victory. Measured in terms of the losses, for the French, the war was a defeat, and the French people feel all of the resentment of the vanquished for the victor. One meets with no generosity; no magnanimity; no chivalry. One feeling alone is encountered—that the war stopped too soon.

"It was not finished up," they say. "We will have to go at it again in a few years." "We should have gone on until the Boche was really beaten," says another. "We should have done the job once and for all," adds a third. "While we had our fingers at their throats," said an old, kindly man who had lost two sons in the war, "we should have pressed a bit harder before letting go. Fifteen days would have done it. Within that time we would have been on German soil where we could have given them a taste of their own medicine."

The bourgeoisie, in control of the schools and of the press of France, are everywhere teaching the children to "Remember!" They are remembering the glories of the First Empire; they are remembering the losses of the war; they are remembering that, at the first opportunity, they must
pay back to the Germans, full measure, the costs of the late war to France.

General Lyautey, making his maiden speech to the French Academy (July, 1920) referred to the burial of Napoleon in the Invalides,—"When, on the fifteenth of December, 1840, the funeral cortège, after having descended the Champs-Elysees, arrived at the portal of the Invalides, he who opened the door before the coffin, announced, as in the days of solemn receptions at the Tuileries: 'The Emperor!' Permit me also, in my turn, at the moment when, in the work of my predecessor there appeared the great shadow of the hero, to announce: 'Gentlemen, the Emperor!'" Later, in the same speech he referred to Napoleon as "the god of war," and these statements were applauded by the men who are supposed to represent the highest cultural attainments of France.

Listen to General de Castelnau speaking, at almost the same time, to the students at Saint-Cyr:—"The French army of this period was attached with the ardor of its patriotic sentiments, the violence of its desires in the coming struggle, to the work of revenge—the final and sacred thought of the fathers and brothers who died in the bitterness of defeat."

Here is M. Raoul Peret, President of the Chamber of Deputies, presiding over the distribution of prizes in the high schools at Potiers (July 29, 1920):—"Sons of conquerors, we shall hand on to you to-morrow, the legacy of a glorious past. Prepare yourselves to be the true artisans of national prosperity, and in order to do that, you must learn how to arm yourselves for the protection of your rights."

The Director of one of the leading cosmopolitan universities in France, speaking at the opening of the session, in July, said to the students:—"We cannot receive students from the enemy countries. It is they who have betrayed civilization."

Le Temps, in an editorial of July 27, in relation to the Spa Conference, says:—"For a Frenchman, with the exception of those who are contaminated by enemy propaganda, it is not necessary to give any reminder of the debt that Germany owes France. ** We are likely to forget quickly, the troubles of others. That is why it is important to refresh constantly, the memory of the Germans, of our Allies,
and even of those Frenchmen, who, having suffered nothing personally, * * * are disposed to sacrifice the reparations due to others.” Then there follows a column and a half of facts and figures dealing with the losses of the French, the wanton destruction of property by the Germans, and the Treaty provisions for restitution.

There is a League in France entitled “The League to Perpetuate Across the Centuries the Memory of Germany’s Crimes.” This League has a central office in Paris and branch offices in the principal cities. From these offices, news matter is sent; circulars are issued; speakers are furnished, and by word of mouth and on paper the German atrocities are repeated until they become a veritable religious creed.

The master of France; her spokesmen; her leading newspapers; her education institutions,—all the machinery at the disposal of the bourgeoisie, is geared up to repeat the phrase “Remember!” The same hatred; the same spirit of revenge that followed after the Franco-Prussian War is being whipped into a frenzy now. Barring two qualifications, the results will be the same. The first of those qualifications is that the French have suffered this time far more than they suffered in 1870: therefore they have far more to remember. The second is that the workers of France are far less simple minded than were the workers of fifty years ago: therefore they are far less amenable to capitalist propaganda then they were then.

These are, however, but incidents in a situation where the masters of the French Empire are doing all that lies in their power to prepare the people of France for the next military struggle.

“How do the masters of Allied Europe feel about the late war?” They feel that it was not finished. They feel that the only part of wisdom is to prepare for the next war.

X. Preparing for the Next

Europe—capitalist Europe—is busy preparing for the next war. Its coming is accepted as something inevitable: something fatal. “Well,” they say to you—men and women alike—“it will begin again!” And many of them add,—
"Alas that it should be so!" Go where you will among the ruling class in the Allied countries and that is the attitude.

A Scotch girl—a school teacher—who had lost more than twenty of her relatives and close personal friends in the war said this with regret,—"I wish that it were not true, but I realize that there must be other wars." "Have you no idea of stopping them?" I asked. "No," she replied, "of course none of the people want them, but what is one to do?" She was helpless before this impending catastrophe.

There are millions like that among the middle and upper classes of Europe. They loath the very name of war, as they hate the thought of death. But they consider both inevitable. You might go a day's journey in France or Great Britain before finding any person who would own up to wanting war. The men and women who make up the bulk of the capitalist world are utterly against it, but they are no more prepared to cope with it than they are prepared to cope with death.

Some are more deliberate and reasoned. "Do you not realize that here in Europe you must choose between the federation of the various countries, and perpetual war?" I asked a French school teacher. "What?" was the rejoinder, "Federate with Germany? Join hands with the Boche? Impossible! If it comes to that, I choose war!" Most people, however, would not go as far as that.

The best that can be said is that the people of the Allied countries do not want another war. Undoubtedly they expect it. Certainly they are preparing for it with a feverish eagerness.

There was one, among Mr. Wilson's Fourteen Points that related to disarmament. Only one nation has been disarmed—that is Germany. Among wild scenes, the German Parliament has voted to abolish military service. After a severe struggle she has agreed to reduce her army to 150,000 by the fall of 1920, but she did both of these things only under a threat of immediate war!

The young men of France are now being called out for their three years of military service. There is some talk of making it two years, and the radicals are demanding only one year of military training on the plea that it is possible to make as good a soldier in one year as it is in three.
The war budget, passed by the French Parliament in July, 1920 calls for the expenditure of two billions of francs. On the proposal to spend 300 millions of francs on the navy there was not a disenting voice. The only consideration was "that France preserve her rank among the powers that preside over the destinies of the world" (Le Temps, July 26) and maintain a navy large enough to accomplish that result.

The preparedness arguments that filled the papers of the United States during 1915 and 1916 are heard everywhere throughout the Allied world. "The only way to prevent war is to be so strong that everyone will be afraid of you," says one chap. Pointing to the tanks that were on parade, a prominent Frenchman remarks,—"While you have those things, you will be master of the road!" A young artillery officer, after three years at the front, declares,—"War would be very good fun if there were not so many people killed." "We must keep ready for the Boche," adds another. "They will keep ready for us."

War is not popular in Britain at the moment. Some of the fleet has been dismantled and the army has been reduced to "peace time strength," but the leaders of opinion and the papers that are most prominent in forming middle and upper class ideas are at one on the proposition that the safety of the Empire and of Britain herself demands that she continue to rule the waves.

Meanwhile, the wars go on, without arousing any great opposition or even any extended comment. The British papers headline the death list in the Mesopotamian campaign (it is called "Mespot" on the streets in the United Kingdom) and describe the natives as "rebels" and "insurrectionists." The London Times (July 10, 1920), discusses the campaign of the Greek army under the heading,—"Greek Army's Fine Form. Turks Thoroughly Beaten." The account that follows is written in the same enthusiastic strain as that ordinarily used to describe a cricket match. The French war in Syria is explained by Le Temps in this way,—"France finds herself in Syria in the face of an enemy that arms itself and attacks us" (July 30, 1920). It continues with the explanation of the impossibility of doing anything else except to continue the war. The war against Russia, fought by Poland, "with French uniforms, American blankets and
British helmets (New York Times) had the almost unanimous support of the capitalist press, and was carried on with the blessing of Millerand (and the assistance of his generals) and was indorsed by Lloyd-George and Giolitti.

“What attitude do the masters of Allied Europe take toward a possible future war?” They regard it as inevitable. They are preparing for it with all of the effectiveness that their somewhat straightened circumstances will permit. Furthermore, they have been encouraging, and supporting, and paying for wars ever since the signing of the Armistice in November, 1918. The Allied diplomats are throwing their dice; the allied high commands are experimenting with poisonous gasses, tanks and air-bombs; the Allied armies and navies are being trained and groomed for the conflict that may break upon them at any moment. War is coming. The bourgeoisie of Europe sees it in the offing, and their leaders propose to be ready for it.

XI. The Promise of Peace

The people of Europe, who paid five years of war as the price of peace, have bought an empty bag. They continued their lives and their fortunes to a system of society that cannot make peace because it is founded on the principles of warfare.

Capitalist society is based on the principle of competition. Under the theory upon which it is founded, the hand of every man is raised against his neighbor in the world of economic life; and it is a short step from a war on the field of commerce to a war in the military arena. This has proved true in the past and it will prove so again. While the art of throat-cutting is preached in business, it will be practiced in the other relations of life, and the more completely the life of a people is dominated by business affairs, the more basically will their lives be influenced by the principle upon which their economic affairs are based.

The great capitalist empires of Europe—Germany, France, Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Italy began the War of 1914. The same statesmen who were in power in the Allied countries, or men holding similar economic views, are in power in the Allied countries to-day. The present political
relations between France and the remainder of Europe are based on the same assumptions as those which eventuated in the ferocious conflict that has not yet terminated, and there is every indication that they will result, again, as they resulted once before, in the desolation of Europe.

European capitalism was incapable of making peace or of keeping peace in 1913. It is equally incapable of making peace to-day.

The political life of Europe is in a state of indescribable confusion. New nations, with uncertain interests, are struggling to assert themselves and to gather, under their jurisdiction, the greatest possible amount of power. The Allied nations are not in agreement on anything, except the necessity of rendering and of keeping Germany impotent. The people of Central Europe are equally in agreement on only one thing—the necessity of regaining their political and economic independence and thus of revenging themselves on the Allies. Meanwhile Russia rises from the ruins of her old empire, the champion of a new world, backed by her vast resources; with her immense population and her rugged power of endurance. Petty states, galore; Great Britain with her world designs and world problems; France, the champion of a dying order of narrow, selfish imperialism; Russia, with her promise of a new world,—this is the picture of political Europe. Add Italy, Greece, Spain, and the smaller neutral countries of the West, and then ask the question how the present system of society can bring order out of such discord without an appeal to arms—not once, but many times.

Turn to the economic side of the picture. The limited resources of Europe; the demands for these resources, stimulated by the war and the fluctuations in purchasing power from boundary to boundary and from week to week; the frightful suffering for lack of coal; the need of iron and of oil, felt by all of the industrial nations alike; the pressure among the bankers from the big nations to absorb everything worth absorbing; the efforts of the "small fry" to gain a foot-hold; the failure of transportation and communication; the starvation and the disease, due to the absence of the most elementary necessaries; the desperation among the suffering peoples; the dizzy fortunes of the profiteers; the
debts and the taxes—saddled so largely on consumption;—
survey this picture, then remember that underneath it are the
machinations of great aggregations of financial and busi-
ness power, manouvering for position, and then talk if you
can, of peace in Europe. As well speak of harmonizing the
interests of labor and capital or of establishing quiet on the
stock exchange.

Beside that, the very name of peace has been made a
by-word since the Allies have spent the time that has fol-
lowed the signing of the Armistice, in fomenting and sup-
porting and participating in wars fought along the Russian
frontier, in Macedonia, Syria and Mesapotamia. Wars have
been going on, and are still going on in every corner of the
European world, by the direct volition of the Allied powers.

I return, then, to the question with which this study began,
and ask them again in the light of the facts and the recent
events of European life:—
1. "Are the Allies at peace?" The answer is, "No.!
2. "How do the masters of Allied Europe feel about
the late war?" The answer is that they are convinced
that, if anything, it did not go far enough. They lost
so much, and paid so high for victory that they ex-
hibit the psychology of defeat.
3. "What attitude do they take toward the next war?"
The answer is that they regard it as inevitable, as in-
deed it is under their economic system; that they are
preparing their people for it and laying their plans for
it at the present moment.

Throughout this discussion I have confined myself to the
Allies, because it was they that promised peace through vic-
tory. They have promised peace, but they cannot secure it.
They have retained an economic system under which such
wars become inevitable. Furthermore, what I have said
about the Allied countries applies to the rulers of those
countries, and not to the workers with whom the rulers are
finding themselves daily in greater disaccord. I have tried
merely to show that the rulers of Allied Europe have nothing
to offer their peoples save a continuation, on a more terrible
scale, of the economic and military struggles of the past.

I have hinted that the people of what were once the
Central Empires are wholly dissatisfied with the outcome of
the war. They have all of the feelings of animosity that France felt after the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, plus the hate and the bitterness engendered by the division of their country, and in addition to that a type of physical suffering on a scale wholly unknown to modern times. The peoples of Central Europe are ready for anything, and it will not require the economic and political contentions among the Allies to start trouble at an early date. Indeed, the ruling class in the Allied countries takes this as a matter of course.

And so the old, brutal struggle will begin again—fostered by the bankers and their handy-men, the diplomats. Homes will be wrecked, families torn asunder, and the best manhood of Europe will become food for canon. Again, the time will come when the fathers bury their sons—if the rulers in the Allied countries and in the Central Powers have their way.

Across this dark background, there shines one ray of light that grows brighter as the days pass. It comes from Russia. It lies in the abolition of the old capitalist system, and in the substitution for it of a system under which the workers control their own industries, and instead of competing for the right to exploit one another, join hands in a co-operative society. As the days pass, and it becomes more and more apparent that Allied capitalism holds no hope for the workers, the peoples of Europe are turning to one another and asking the question,—"If capitalism cannot save us from war and disease and starvation, what can?" And for their answer they are looking to Russia.

THE END
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